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THE ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION 
AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS IN FEDERAL 
RULEMAKING 
Curtis W. Copeland* 
 INTRODUCTION 
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is one of 
several statutory offices within the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB),1 and can play a significant—if not determinative—role in the 
rulemaking process for most federal agencies.  In addition to its many other 
responsibilities, OIRA reviews the substance of about 600 to 700 
significant proposed and final rules each year before agencies publish them 
in the Federal Register,2 and can clear the rules with or without change, 
return them to the agencies for “reconsideration,” or encourage the 
agencies to withdraw the rules.  About 100 of the rules that OIRA reviews 
each year are each considered “economically significant” or “major” (e.g., 
expected to have a $100 million impact on the economy).3
 
* The author is a Specialist in American National Government at the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) within the Library of Congress.  This paper represents his views 
and not necessarily those of CRS or the Library.  The author would like to thank those who 
reviewed earlier drafts of this Article, including Mort Rosenberg, Harold Relyea, and 
Clinton Brass of CRS, and Timothy Bober of the Government Accountability Office.  
  OIRA was 
created by Congress and has a number of specific statutory responsibilities, 
but also helps ensure that agencies’ rules reflect the president’s policies and 
 1. The other statutory offices, which are sometimes collectively referred to as the 
“management” side of Office of Management and Budget (OMB), are the Office of Federal 
Financial Management, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, and the Office of 
Electronic Government and Information Technology.  OMB’s resource management offices 
(RMOs) review agencies’ budget submissions, and are sometimes collectively referred to as 
OMB’s “budget” side.  However, the RMOs also include management issues in their budget 
reviews, and do other “management” work as well. 
 2. The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000), generally 
requires agencies to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register, permit 
the public to comment on the proposed rule, and then publish a final rule addressing the 
comments provided. 
 3. To view the economically significant rules that OIRA reviews each year, in total or 
for particular agencies, see http://www.reginfo.gov/public/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2006). 
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priorities. 
OIRA’s role in the federal rulemaking process has been highly 
controversial in all four of the presidential administrations in which it has 
been in existence, but the criticisms directed at the office have varied over 
time.  In some administrations, OIRA has been accused of controlling the 
agenda of the rulemaking agencies too much, directing them to change 
substantive provisions in draft rules, or even stopping proposed regulatory 
actions that it believes are poorly crafted or unnecessary.4  At other times, 
though, OIRA has been accused of exerting inadequate authority over the 
agencies’ rules.5  Other, more persistent criticisms have focused on the lack 
of transparency of OIRA’s regulatory reviews to the public and the 
sometimes-unseen influence that regulated entities and other non-
governmental organizations can have on agencies’ rules through those 
reviews.6
This Article describes the process OIRA uses to review covered 
agencies’ draft rules, OIRA’s effects on the rules, and changes in OIRA’s 
procedures and policies in recent years.  Much of this discussion is drawn 
from a September 2003 report on OIRA that I helped develop when I was 
with the General Accounting Office (GAO, now the Government 
Accountability Office).
   
7
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF REGULATORY REVIEW IN OIRA 
  First, though, this Article provides a brief history 
of presidential regulatory review and describes how OIRA’s review process 
was established.  Finally, the Article describes several potential legislative 
issues regarding OIRA’s regulatory review authority, and makes a few 
concluding observations both about OIRA’s recent initiatives and its future. 
OIRA was created within OMB by the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) 
of 1980.8
 
 4. See, e.g., GEORGE C. EADS & MICHAEL FIX, RELIEF OR REFORM?  REAGAN’S 
REGULATORY DILEMMA 135-38 (1984). 
  The PRA provided that OIRA would be headed by an 
administrator who was designated the “principal advisor to the Director on 
 5. JAMES L. GATTUSO, THE HERITAGE FOUND., EXEC. MEMO. NO. 813, REGULATING THE 
REGULATORS 2 (2002) (noting that “OIRA became a much less aggressive watchdog than it 
had been under previous Presidents,” and citing as evidence the decline in the number of 
rules returned to the agencies). 
 6. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-929, RULEMAKING: OMB’S ROLE IN 
REVIEWS OF AGENCIES’ DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS 54 
(2003) [hereinafter GAO, RULEMAKING]. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 1980, 44 U.S.C. § 3503(a) (1980) (amended 
1995). 
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Federal information policy.”9  The Act also provided that the director of 
OMB “shall delegate to the [OIRA] Administrator the authority to 
administer all functions under this chapter.”10  Specific areas of 
responsibility in the PRA that were assigned to the director, and later 
delegated to OIRA, included information policy, information collection 
request clearance and paperwork control, statistical policy and 
coordination, records management, privacy, and automatic data processing 
and telecommunications.11
The PRA’s requirements cover rules issued by virtually all agencies, 
including Cabinet departments, independent agencies, and independent 
regulatory agencies and commissions.
  With regard to paperwork reduction, the Act 
generally prohibited agencies from conducting or sponsoring a collection of 
information until they had submitted their proposed information collection 
requests to OIRA and the office had approved those requests.  
12
Although the PRA gave OIRA substantive responsibilities in many 
areas, the bulk of the office’s day-to-day activities under the act were 
initially focused on reviewing and approving agencies’ proposed 
information collection requests.  OIRA had ninety staff members when the 
PRA took effect in 1981, about half of whom were involved in reviewing 
agencies’ information collection requests.
  
13  That year, OIRA took nearly 
5,000 paperwork review actions—approving new and revised collections, 
extending existing collections, and reinstating expired collections. The 
office’s paperwork clearance workload since then has generally been 
between 4,000 and 6,000 actions each year, although the number of OIRA 
staff overall, and those reviewing proposed collections, has declined 
substantially.14
 
 9. Id. § 3503(b). 
  Although many federal regulations have an information 
collection component, the PRA did not authorize OIRA to review or 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. § 3504.  The PRA was later amended in 1986, and again in 1995, and the list of 
OIRA’s duties changed somewhat.  For example, the 1986 amendments sharpened the 
management focus of the act and changed the term “information policy” to “information 
resources management.”  Paperwork Reduction Act of 1986, 44 U.S.C. § 3501(3) (1986) 
(amended 1995).  The 1986 amendment also required the administrator of OIRA to be 
appointed by the President, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.  Id. § 3503(2). 
 12. As used in this Article, the term “independent regulatory agencies” refers to 
agencies established to be independent of the President, including the Federal 
Communications Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission.  The term “independent agencies” refers to agencies that are 
independent of Cabinet departments, but not independent regulatory agencies, including the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Office of Personnel Management. 
 13. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 60. 
 14. Id. 
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comment on the substance of those regulations, or on regulations without 
an information collection component.15
OIRA AND THE REAGAN EXECUTIVE ORDERS ON REGULATORY 
REVIEW 
   
In 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected President on a platform critical of 
government’s role in society in general, and of federal regulations in 
particular.16  Shortly after taking office, he established a “Presidential Task 
Force on Regulatory Relief,” headed by Vice President George H. W. 
Bush, and composed of Cabinet officers (although the bulk of the task 
force’s work was reportedly performed by OMB staff).  The task force’s 
responsibilities included: (1) monitoring the establishment of OMB’s 
responsibility to coordinate and review new rules, (2) the development of 
legislative changes to regulatory statutes, and (3) the revision of existing 
regulations.17  With respect to this last responsibility, the task force 
ultimately identified a total of 119 rules for alteration or cancellation by the 
issuing agencies, nearly half of which had been issued by the Department 
of Transportation (DOT) or the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA).18  Although the task force found that the implementation of 
recommended changes would save more than $150 billion over the next ten 
years, critics charged that this estimate ignored the benefits associated with 
the rules on what they referred to as the administration’s regulatory “hit 
list.”19  The task force’s legislative efforts were less successful, and failed 
to prompt Congress to enact revisions to clean air and water laws, or to 
enact broad regulatory reform legislation that would have limited agencies’ 
rulemaking powers.20
In February 1981—less than one month after taking office—President 
Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291, which greatly increased both the 
 
 
 15. In some cases, though, the paperwork requirement may be the essence of the 
regulation. For example, EPA’s Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) program is essentially a 
database of information that is collected from the businesses that are required to provide it, 
which serves the purpose of making members of the public aware of chemical hazards in 
their communities. For more information on the TRI program, see U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
Toxics Release Inventory Program, http://www.epa.gov/tri/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2006). 
 16. See EADS & FIX, supra note 4, at 1-2. 
 17. Letter from Vice President George Bush, transmitting report on the status of the 
Reagan Administration’s regulatory relief efforts (Aug. 11, 1983) (on file with author). 
 18. See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON REGULATORY RELIEF, REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 
REGULATORY ACHIEVEMENTS (1983). 
 19. Id. 
 20. The task force was disbanded in August 1983 after issuing its final report. 
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scope and importance of OIRA’s responsibilities.21
• Refrain from taking regulatory action “unless the potential benefits to 
society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society,” to select 
regulatory objectives to maximize net benefits to society, and to select the 
regulatory alternative that involves the lowest net cost to society;
  The executive order 
generally required covered agencies (Cabinet departments and independent 
agencies, but not independent regulatory agencies) to:  
22
• Prepare a “regulatory impact analysis” for each “major” rule,
 
23 which 
was defined as any regulation likely to result in (among other things) an 
annual effect on the economy of $100 million.24  Those analyses were 
required to contain a description of the potential benefits and costs of the 
rule, a description of alternative approaches that could achieve the 
regulatory goal at lower cost (and a list of reasons why they were not 
selected), and a determination of the net benefits of the rule.25  The issuing 
agency was to make the initial determination of whether a rule was 
“major,” but the executive order gave OMB the authority to require a rule 
to be considered major;26
• Send a copy of each draft proposed and final rule to OMB before 
publication in the Federal Register.
 and   
27  The order authorized OMB to 
review “any preliminary or final regulatory impact analysis, notice of 
proposed rulemaking, or final rule based on the requirements of this 
Order.”28  Non-major rules were required to be submitted to OMB at least 
ten days before publication, but major rules had to be submitted as much as 
sixty days in advance.29
Executive Order 12,291 indicated that OMB’s review of rules and 
impact analyses should be completed within sixty days, but it allowed the 
director to extend that period whenever necessary.
 
30
 
 21. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981).  For a description of 
the effects of this order, see Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management 
& Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive 
Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 1, 80 (1984).  
  It also authorized the 
director to exempt classes of regulations from any or all of the order’s 
requirements, and generally required agencies to “refrain” from publishing 
 22. Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 21, § 2(a)-(e). 
 23. Id. § 3(a). 
 24. Id. § 1(b). 
 25. Id. §§ 3(d)(1)-(5). 
 26. Id. § 3(b). 
 27. Id. § 3(c). 
28 Id. § 3(e)(1). 
 29. Id. § 3(c)(1)-(3). 
 30. Id. § 8. 
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any final rules until they had responded to OMB’s comments. 31  The 
executive order made OMB’s authority to review agencies’ draft rules 
subject to the overall direction of the presidential task force on regulatory 
relief.32
Although the Executive Order did not specifically mention OIRA, 
shortly after it was issued the Reagan Administration decided to integrate 
OMB’s regulatory review responsibilities under the executive order with 
the responsibilities given to OMB (and ultimately to OIRA) by the PRA.
 
33  
As a result, OIRA’s responsibilities for substantive review of rules under 
the executive order were added to the office’s substantial responsibilities 
under the PRA.  In 1981, OIRA reviewed the substance of nearly 2,800 
rules under Executive Order 12,291—in addition to the nearly 5,000 
paperwork review actions it took that year.34
In 1985, President Reagan extended OIRA’s influence over rulemaking 
even further by issuing Executive Order 12,498, which required Cabinet 
departments and independent agencies (but not independent regulatory 
agencies) to submit a “regulatory program” to OMB for review each year 
that covered all of their significant regulatory actions that were underway 
or planned.
 
35  Previously, Executive Order 12,291 had required each of 
those agencies to publish semiannual “regulatory agendas” of proposed 
regulations that the agency “has issued or expects to issue,” and any 
existing rule that was under review.36
 
 31. See id.  The exemptions that OMB was authorized to grant fell into four broad 
categories: (1) rules that were essentially non-regulatory in nature; (2) rules that delegated 
regulatory authority to the States; (3) rules that generally affected individual entities and that 
did not involve broader policy issues; and (4) rules for which a delay of even a few days 
could have imposed substantial costs and that were unlikely to involve significant policy 
issues.  Id.  OMB granted about thirty exemptions, most of which were established in 1981 
or 1982. 
  These agendas were required to 
contain a schedule for completing action on any major rule for which the 
agency had published a notice of proposed rulemaking.  The new executive 
order went further, providing that, except in “unusual circumstances,” 
OMB could return any rule submitted for review under Executive Order 
 32. Id. § 3(e)(1).  Although Vice President Bush chaired the task force, the administrator 
of OIRA served as its executive director.  Other members of the task force included the 
Director of OMB, the Attorney General, and the Secretaries of Commerce, Labor, and the 
Treasury. 
 33. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET: EVOLVING ROLES 
AND FUTURE ISSUES 201-10 (1986) [hereinafter CRS, EVOLVING ROLES]. 
 34. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-89-101FS REGULATORY REVIEW: 
INFORMATION ON OMB’S REVIEW PROCESS 14 (1989). 
 35. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (Jan. 8, 1985). 
 36. President Carter first required the use of these agendas in 1978.  See Exec. Order 
No. 12,291, supra note 21, § 5. 
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12,291 to the issuing agency for “reconsideration” if it was not in the 
agency’s regulatory program for that year, or was “materially different” 
from what was described in the program.37  In other words, OIRA could 
return a draft rule to an issuing agency if the office did not have advance 
notice of the rule’s submission, even if the rule was otherwise consistent 
with the requirements in Executive Order 12,291.38  The regulatory agenda 
and program requirements in these executive orders also permitted OIRA 
to become aware of forthcoming agency actions well in advance of the 
submission of a draft proposed rule, thereby permitting the office to stop or 
alter an objectionable rule before the rulemaking process developed 
momentum.  Although Reagan Administration officials compared this 
planning process to the process used to develop the President’s budget, 
critics noted that the budget process has a final step that the regulatory 
process lacked—review and approval by Congress.39  Therefore, they 
argued, the insertion of OIRA into the regulatory planning process 
represented a further aggregation of at least potential policymaking power 
in the hands of the OIRA Administrator and, more generally, the Executive 
Office of the President.40
COMPARISON TO PREVIOUS REGULATORY REVIEW EFFORTS  
  
The establishment of a broad regulatory review function within OIRA by 
Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498 was a significant development both in 
the office’s history and in the overall movement to reform the federal 
regulatory process.  In another sense, though, these executive orders 
represented the continuation of the presidential review of rules, not the 
starting point thereof. Some form of centralized review of agencies’ 
regulations within the Executive Office of the President has been part of 
the rulemaking process since the early 1970s.  For example:  
• In 1971, President Nixon established a “Quality of Life Review” 
program in which executive departments and independent agencies 
submitted all “significant” draft proposed and final rules pertaining to 
“environmental quality, consumer protection, and occupational and public 
health and safety” to OMB, which then circulated them to other agencies 
 
 37. Exec. Order No. 12,498, supra note 35, §§ 3(d). 
 38. An OIRA representative said that the office had never used this authority, noting 
that it would have been difficult to defend the return of an agency’s rule for purely 
procedural reasons.  Interview with OIRA representative, in Old Executive Office Building, 
Washington, D.C. (2003) (on file with author) (part of a series of interviews with various 
representatives from OIRA as research for GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6). 
 39. CRS, EVOLVING ROLES, supra note 33, at 201-04. 
 40. Id. 
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for comment.41  In their submissions, agencies were to provide a summary 
of their proposals, including their principal objectives, the alternatives that 
they considered, and a comparison of the expected benefits and cost of 
those alternatives.  Agencies were also required to submit a schedule 
showing estimated dates of proposed and final significant rules.42
• In 1974, President Ford issued Executive Order 11,821, which required 
agencies to prepare an “inflation impact statement” for each “major” 
proposed rule.
  
43
• In 1978, President Carter issued Executive Order 12,044, which 
(among other things) required agencies to publish semiannual agendas of 
any significant rules under development or review, and to prepare a 
regulatory analysis for all rules that have a more than $100 million impact 
on the economy.
  The statement was a certification that the inflationary 
impact of the rule had been evaluated in accordance with criteria and 
procedures developed by OMB.  The executive order directed OMB to 
develop criteria for the identification of major rules that may have a 
significant impact on inflation, but specified that the office must consider 
costs, effects on productivity, effects on competition, and effects on the 
supply of important products and services.  Before a major rule was 
published in the Federal Register, the issuing agency was required to 
submit the associated impact statement to the Council on Wage and Price 
Stability (CWPS).  CWPS would then either provide comments directly to 
the agency or participate in the regular rulemaking comment process.  
44  The analysis was to contain a succinct statement of the 
problem, a description of the alternative approaches considered, and the 
“economic consequences” of those alternatives.45  OMB was instructed to 
“assure the effective implementation of this Order,” but was not given 
specific review responsibilities.46  President Carter also established (1) a 
“Regulatory Analysis Review Group” (RARG) to review the analyses 
prepared for certain major rules, and to submit comments during the 
comment period; and (2) a “Regulatory Council” to coordinate agencies’ 
actions to avoid conflicting requirements and duplication of effort.47
In several ways, though, the analytical and review requirements in 
  
 
 41. This requirement was formally established in October 1971.  According to some 
observers, the requirements were routinely imposed only on EPA.  Memorandum from 
George Schultz, Director, Office of Mgmt. & Budget (Oct. 1971), available at 
http://thecred.com/ombpapers/qualityoflife.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2006). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (Nov. 29, 1974). 
 44. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661, § 3(a)(1) (Mar. 24, 1978). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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Executive Order 12,291 were significantly different from these previous 
efforts.  For example, the requirement in the new executive order that 
agencies choose the least costly approach to a particular regulatory 
objective went further than the requirement in President Carter’s Executive 
Order 12,044, which simply required agencies to analyze and consider 
alternative regulatory approaches.  Also, whereas the regulatory oversight 
functions were divided among many offices (OMB, CWPS, RARG, and the 
regulatory council) during the Carter Administration, Executive Order 
12,291 consolidated these functions within OIRA.48
Another major difference was the amount of influence that OIRA had 
compared to its predecessors.  Under previous executive orders, CWPS and 
RARG primarily had advisory roles.  In contrast, under Executive Order 
12,291, OIRA could overrule agency determinations regarding whether the 
rule was “major” (and therefore required a regulatory impact analysis), and 
could delay the regulation at either the proposed or final rulemaking stage 
until the agency had adequately responded to its concerns (e.g., if it 
believed the agency had not considered all reasonable alternatives, or that 
the agency’s analysis was unsound, or contrary to the administration’s 
policy viewpoint).
 
49
EARLY VIEWS REGARDING OIRA REVIEWS 
  OIRA’s significant influence on rulemaking was 
underscored by its organizational position within OMB, the agency that 
reviews and approves the rulemaking agencies’ budget requests on behalf 
of the President.  Finally, the nature and transparency of the review process 
was significantly different under Executive Order 12,291.  Under the Carter 
Administration’s approach, RARG and CWPS prepared and filed 
comments on agency proposals during the formal public comment period.  
In the case of RARG filings, a draft of the comments was circulated to all 
RARG members, and the comments, along with any dissents, were placed 
on the public record at the close of the comment period.  In contrast, 
OIRA’s reviews occurred before the rules were published for comment, 
and Executive Order 12,291 did not require that OIRA’s comments on the 
draft rule be disclosed.  
The expansion of OIRA’s authority in the rulemaking process via 
Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498 was highly controversial.  Although 
some believed that OIRA’s authority did not go far enough (e.g., the review 
requirements did not cover independent regulatory agencies), most of the 
 
 48. George Eads, Harnessing Regulation: The Evolving Role of White House Oversight, 
5 REGULATION 19, 26 (1981). 
 49. Executive Order No. 12,291, supra note 21, §§ 3(b), 3(f). 
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concerns were that the expansion had gone too far.  For example, a number 
of the concerns raised by members of Congress, public interest groups, and 
others focused on whether OIRA’s role violated the constitutional 
separation of powers, and on the effect that OIRA’s review process had on 
public participation and the timeliness of agencies’ rules.50  Some believed 
that OIRA’s new authority displaced the discretionary authority of agency 
decision makers in violation of congressional delegations of rulemaking 
authority, and that the President exceeded his authority in issuing the 
executive orders.51  Others indicated that OIRA did not have the technical 
expertise needed to instruct agencies about the content of their rules.52  Still 
other concerns focused on OIRA’s ability to carry out its many 
responsibilities.  In 1983, GAO concluded that the expansion of OIRA’s 
responsibilities under Executive Order 12,291 had adversely affected the 
office’s ability to carry out its PRA responsibilities, and recommended that 
Congress consider amending the act to prohibit OIRA from carrying out 
other responsibilities like regulatory review.53
Other concerns about OIRA focused on the lack of transparency of the 
regulatory reviews, and specifically questioned whether OIRA had become 
a clandestine conduit for outside influence in the rulemaking process.  
Critics pointed out that, in the first few months after the executive order 
was issued, OIRA met with representatives from dozens of businesses and 
associations seeking regulatory relief and returned dozens of rules to the 
agencies for reconsideration.
 
54  In response to these concerns, the OMB 
Director issued a memorandum in June 1981 stating that any factual 
material provided to OIRA regarding proposed rules should also be sent to 
the relevant rulemaking agency.55
 
 50. Role of OMB in Regulation, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & 
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. (1981).  See also 
Morton Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of Agency 
Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REV. 193, 193-247 (1981). 
  This requirement did not, however, 
 51. For a discussion of this argument, see Olson, supra note 21, at 17-27. 
 52. Others, however, argued that OIRA provided expertise in the regulatory process, and 
could offer a wider range of options.  See BARRY D. FRIEDMAN, REGULATION IN THE 
REAGAN-BUSH ERA: THE ERUPTION OF PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE 54-55 (1995). 
 53. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-83-35, IMPLEMENTING THE PAPERWORK 
REDUCTION ACT: SOME PROGRESS, BUT MANY PROBLEMS REMAIN 9 (1983). 
 54. See Letter from James C. Miller III, Administrator of OIRA, to the Honorable John 
D. Dingell, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of H. Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce (Apr. 28, 1981), available at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/Dingell.pdf (last visited 
May 12, 2006).  
 55. Role of OMB in Regulation, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & 
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 97th Cong. 46 (1981) (statement of 
James C. Miller III, OIRA Administrator, characterizing OMB Director Stockman’s 
memorandum), available at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/Reagan61881.PDF. 
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apply to information provided to OIRA orally, and did not require that 
OIRA’s meetings with outside parties be disclosed to the public. 
OIRA’s role in the rulemaking process remained controversial for the 
next several years.  In 1983, Congress was so dissatisfied with OIRA’s 
performance in the areas of regulatory and paperwork review that it 
permitted the office’s appropriation authority to expire (although the 
office’s statutory authority under the PRA was not affected and it continued 
to receive an appropriation via OMB).56  In 1985, five House Committee 
chairmen filed an amicus brief in a lawsuit brought against the Department 
of Labor (DOL) regarding the DOL’s decision (reportedly at the behest of 
OMB) not to pursue a proposed standard concerning exposure to ethylene 
oxide, a sterilizing chemical widely used in hospitals and suspected of 
causing cancer.  The chairmen claimed that OMB’s actions represented a 
usurpation of congressional authority.57
Congress reauthorized OIRA in 1986, but only after making the 
Administrator subject to Senate confirmation.  By 1986, Congress began 
considering legislation to restrict OIRA’s regulatory review role and to 
block OIRA’s budget request.
  
58  In June 1986, in an attempt to head off 
that legislation, the presiding OIRA Administrator issued a memorandum 
to the heads of departments and agencies subject to Executive Order 
12,291, describing new procedures to improve the transparency of the 
review process.59  For example, the memorandum said that only the 
administrator or the deputy administrator could communicate with outside 
parties regarding rules submitted for review, and that OIRA would make 
available to the public all written materials received from outside parties.60
 
 56. OIRA’s authorization for appropriation also expired in 2001, and has not been 
reestablished. See 44 U.S.C. § 3520 (authorizing $8 million for PRA-related activities “and 
for no other purpose” in fiscal years 1996 through 2001). 
  
OIRA also said that it would, upon written request after a rule had been 
published, make available all written correspondence between OIRA and 
 57. Morton Rosenberg, Regulatory Management at OMB, in CRS, EVOLVING ROLES, 
supra note 
33, at 185, 218 (1986). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Memorandum from Wendy L. Gramm, OIRA Administrator, to Heads of Dept’s and 
Agencies Subject to Executive Order Nos. 12,291 and 12,498 on Additional Procedures 
Concerning OIRA Reviews Under Executive Order Nos. 12,291 and 12,498 [Revised] (June 
13, 1986), reprinted in U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT APRIL 1, 1992—MARCH 31, 1993, at 585 (1993). 
 60. Id.  For further information on this policy, see Judith Havemann, No ‘Shade-Drawn’ 
Dealings for OMB; Congress Gets Disclosure of Regulation-Review Procedures, WASH. 
POST, Jun. 17, 1986, at A21. 
COPELAND_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:22 PM 
112 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIII 
the agency head regarding the draft submitted for review.61
In 1987, the National Academy of Public Administration published a 
report on presidential management of agency rulemaking that summarized 
the criticisms of the OIRA review process, as well as the positions of its 
proponents.
 
62  The report also described a number of issues in regulatory 
review and offered recommendations for improvement.  For example, the 
report recommended that “regulatory management be accepted as an 
essential element of presidential management.”63  It also recommended that 
regulatory agencies “log, summarize, and include in the rulemaking record 
all communications from outside parties, OMB, or other executive or 
legislative branch officials concerning the merits of proposed 
regulations.”64
In 1988, the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) 
examined the issue of presidential review of agency rulemaking and 
concluded that such reviews could improve coordination and resolve 
conflicts among agencies.
   
65  ACUS also said, though, that presidential 
review “does not displace responsibilities placed in the agency by law nor 
authorize the use of factors not otherwise permitted by law.”66  ACUS 
recommended public disclosure of proposed and final agency rules 
submitted to OIRA under the executive order, communications from OMB 
relating to the substance of rules, and communications with outside parties, 
and also recommended that the reviews be completed in a “timely 
fashion.”67
 
 61. Id. 
  
 62. NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT OF RULEMAKING IN 
REGULATORY AGENCIES (1987) [hereinafter NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., PRESIDENTIAL 
MANAGEMENT OF RULEMAKING].  
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 1 C.F.R. § 
305.88-9 (1988), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/305889.html (last 
visited May 3, 2006).  The Administrative Conference was established in 1968 to provide 
advice regarding procedural improvements in federal programs, and was eliminated by 
Congress in 1995.  See Cindy Skrzycki, Interest Grows in Resurrecting Administrative 
Conference, WASH. POST, May 25, 2004, at E01. 
 66. Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, supra note 
65. 
 67. Id.  The National Academy of Public Administration and the American Bar 
Association (ABA) have also recognized the potential value of presidential regulatory 
review, recommending such reforms as improved transparency and better communication 
between OIRA and agency staff.  See NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., PRESIDENTIAL 
MANAGEMENT OF RULEMAKING, supra note 62; see also Letter from William Funk, Chair-
Elect, Am. Bar Ass’n, to Lorraine Hunt, Office of Info. & Reg. Affairs (Apr. 24, 2003), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/policy_letters/sec_comments_omb.doc (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2006) (summarizing the ABA’s previous recommendations). 
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OIRA AND THE GEORGE H. W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
President George H. W. Bush continued the implementation of 
Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498 during his administration, but external 
events significantly affected OIRA’s operation and, more generally, the 
federal rulemaking process.  In response to published accounts that the 
burden of regulation was once again increasing, President Bush established 
the President’s “Council on Competitiveness” (also known as the 
Competitiveness Council) to review regulations issued by agencies.68  
Chaired by Vice President Dan Quayle, the council oversaw and was 
supported by OIRA, and reviewed particular rules that it believed would 
have a significant impact on the economy or particular industries.  The 
council signified continued White House-level interest in the regulatory 
arena, and also represented a continuation of the type of role played by the 
Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief during the Reagan 
Administration.69
Many of the Competitiveness Council’s actions were highly 
controversial, with critics assailing both the effects of those actions (e.g., 
rolling back environmental or other requirements) and the fact that the 
council acted in secret.
   
70  The council attempted to maintain strict secrecy 
regarding both its deliberations and the identity of those in the private 
sector with whom it communicated or consulted.71  Critics decried what 
they believed to be “backdoor rulemaking” by the Competitiveness 
Council, but the council continued its operations until the end of the Bush 
Administration in 1993.72  Meanwhile, OIRA continued its operations 
under Executive Order 12,291, reviewing between 2,100 and 2,600 
proposed and final rules each year from 1989 through 1992.73
 
 68. The Competitiveness Council was reportedly created in April 1989 when the Vice 
President issued a press release, causing some to question its legitimacy.  See Caroline 
DeWitt, The President’s Council on Competitiveness: Undermining the Administrative 
Procedure Act with Regulatory Review, 6 ADMIN. L. REV. 759, 800 (1993). 
   
 69. Id. 
 70. See CHRISTINE TRIANO & NANCY WATZMAN, OMB WATCH/PUB. CITIZEN, ALL THE 
VICE PRESIDENT’S MEN: HOW THE QUAYLE COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS SECRETLY 
UNDERMINES HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS (1991).  
 71. See Bob Woodward & David Broder, Quayle’s Quest: Curb Rules, Leave ‘No 
Fingerprints,’ WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1992, at A1.  
 72. For example, Representative Henry Waxman reportedly considered the Council a 
“shadow government.”  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 166. 
 73. For the number of OMB reviews conducted each year, see 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoCountsSearchInit?action=init (last visited May 12, 
2006).  The number of OIRA reviews is graphically depicted in GAO, RULEMAKING, supra 
note 6, at 24. 
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REGULATORY REVIEW UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,866 
In September 1993, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,866 on 
“Regulatory Planning and Review,” which revoked Executive Orders 
12,291 and 12,498, and abolished the Council on Competitiveness.74  
Although different from its predecessors in many respects, Executive Order 
12,866 (which is still in effect) continued the general framework of 
presidential review of rulemaking.  For example, it requires covered 
agencies (again, Cabinet departments and independent agencies, but not 
independent regulatory agencies) to submit their proposed and final rules to 
OMB before publishing them in the Federal Register.75  The order also 
requires agencies to prepare cost-benefit analyses for their “economically 
significant” rules (which are essentially the same as “major” rules under 
Executive Order 12,291).76  As discussed in detail below, however, 
Executive Order 12,866 established a somewhat new regulatory philosophy 
and a new set of rulemaking principles, limited OIRA’s reviews to certain 
types of rules, and also put new transparency requirements in place.  
Section 2(b) of the order assigns responsibility for review of agency 
rulemaking to OMB, and specifically names OIRA “the repository of 
expertise concerning regulatory issues.”77  The order also names the Vice 
President the principal advisor to the President on regulatory policy, 
planning, and review.78
SPECIFIC PROVISIONS IN THE EXECUTIVE ORDER 
 
In its statement of regulatory philosophy, Executive Order 12,866 says, 
among other things, that agencies should assess all costs and benefits of 
available regulatory alternatives, including both quantitative and qualitative 
measures.79  It also provides that agencies should select regulatory 
approaches that maximize net benefits (unless a statute requires another 
approach).80
 
 74. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/eo12866.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2006). 
  Where permissible and applicable, the order states that 
agencies should adhere to a set of principles when developing rules, 
 75. Id. at 51,741. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 51,737. 
 78. Id.  Executive Order 13,258, issued in February 2002, amended Executive Order 
12,866 and reassigned all roles originally assigned to the Vice President to the President’s 
chief of staff.  See Exec. Order No. 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9,385 (Feb. 28, 2002), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/eo13258.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2006). 
 79. Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 74, at 51,735. 
 80. Id. 
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including: (1) consideration of the degree and nature of risk posed when 
setting regulatory priorities, (2) adoption of regulations only upon a 
“reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify 
its costs,” and (3) tailoring regulations to impose the least burden on 
society needed to achieve the regulatory objectives.81  Some of the stated 
objectives of the order are “to reaffirm the primacy of Federal agencies in 
the regulatory decision-making process; to restore the integrity and 
legitimacy of regulatory review and oversight; and to make the process 
more accessible and open to the public.”82
Section six of Executive Order 12,866 established agency and OIRA 
responsibilities in the centralized review of regulations.
  This reference to the “primacy 
of Federal agencies” signaled a significant change in regulatory 
philosophy, vesting greater control of the rulemaking process with 
regulatory agencies and taking away authority from OIRA.  Further, the 
requirement that the benefits of a regulation “justify” its costs is a 
noticeably lower threshold than the requirement in Executive Order 12,291 
that the benefits “outweigh” the costs. 
83
Any regulatory action that is likely to result in a rule that may (1) have an 
annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect 
in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, 
competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, 
or tribal governments or communities; (2) create a serious inconsistency 
or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another agency; 
(3) materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, 
or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof; or (4) 
raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the 
President’s priorities, or the principles set forth in the Executive order.
  In contrast to the 
broad scope of review under Executive Order 12,291, the new order limited 
OIRA reviews to actions identified by the rulemaking agency or OIRA as  
“significant” regulatory actions, which are defined in section 2(f) of the 
order as the following:  
84
By focusing OIRA’s reviews on significant rules, the number of draft 
proposed and final rules that OIRA examined fell from between 2,000 and 
3,000 per year under Executive Order 12,291 to between 500 and about 
700 rules per year under Executive Order 12,866.
  
85
 
 81. Id. at 51,735-36. 
  Most of the rules no 
longer reviewed are “routine and frequent” or 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 51,740. 
 84. Id. at 51,738. 
 85. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 24. 
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“informational/administrative” rules, though some have substantive 
impacts but fall short of the above definition of “significant.”86
Executive Order 12,866 also differs from its predecessors in other 
respects.  For example, the order generally requires that OIRA complete its 
review of proposed and final rules within ninety calendar days, and 
requires both the agencies and OIRA to disclose certain information about 
how the regulatory reviews were conducted.
  
87  Specifically, agencies are 
required to identify for the public (1) the substantive changes made to rules 
between the draft submitted to OIRA for review and the action 
subsequently announced, and (2) changes made at the suggestion or 
recommendation of OIRA.88  OIRA is required to provide agencies with a 
copy of all written communications between OIRA personnel and parties 
outside of the executive branch, and a list of the dates and names of 
individuals involved in substantive oral communications.89  The order also 
instructs OIRA to maintain a public log of all regulatory actions under 
review, and of all of the above-mentioned documents provided to the 
agencies.90
OIRA’S FORMAL REVIEW PROCESS  
   
OIRA reviews agencies’ draft rules at both the proposed and final stages 
of rulemaking.91  In each phase, the review process starts when the 
rulemaking agency formally submits a regulatory review package to OIRA 
consisting of the rule, any supporting materials, and a transmittal form.92
 
 86. GPO Access, The Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/ua/index.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2006). These categories of 
rulemaking provide information in a consistent format about regulations that agencies are 
considering or reviewing.  
  
The OIRA docket librarian then logs the receipt of the review package and 
forwards it to the appropriate desk officer.  In some cases, agencies 
withdraw their rules from OIRA during the review period and the rules 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.  For a discussion of the differences between the transparency requirements under 
Executive Order 12,291 and Executive Order 12,866, see William D. Araiza, Judicial and 
Legislative Checks on Ex Parte OMB Influence Over Rulemaking, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 611 
(2002); Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The 
Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161 (1995). 
 91. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 30.  In recent years, thirty-to-forty percent of 
OIRA’s reviews have been proposed rules, and fifty-to-sixty percent have been final rules.  
OIRA also reviews other rulemaking documents (e.g., pre-rule documents and notices), 
accounting for ten-to-fifteen percent of its review actions. 
 92. Id. 
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may or may not be subsequently resubmitted.  At the end of the review 
period, OIRA either returns the draft rule to the agency “for 
reconsideration” or OIRA concludes that the rule is consistent with the 
executive order.  OIRA codes the rule in its database as “consistent with 
change” if there had been any changes to the rule, regardless of the source 
or extent of the change.  OIRA codes rules in its database as “consistent 
with no change” only if they are exactly the same at the end of the review 
period as the original submission.  If the draft rule is a proposed rule and is 
judged by OIRA to be consistent with the requirements in Executive Order 
12,866, the agency may then publish a notice of proposed rulemaking in 
the Federal Register, obtain comments during the specified comment 
period, review the comments received, and make any changes to the rule 
that it believes are necessary to respond to those comments (the executive 
order says that this comment period should, in most cases, be at least sixty 
days for significant rules reviewed by OIRA).93
OUTCOMES OF OIRA’S REVIEWS  
  If the draft is a final rule, 
the agency may publish the rule after OIRA concludes its review and the 
rule will generally take effect either at that point or at some later date 
specified by the agency. 
As Table 1 indicates, in most of the years since Executive Order 12,866 
was issued, more than ninety percent of the rules that OIRA reviewed have 
been coded in the database as either “consistent with change” or “consistent 
without change.”94
 
  Only a small percentage of rules were withdrawn, and 
even fewer were returned to the agencies.  The proportion of rules coded as 
“changed” has varied somewhat over time, but the last several years of the 
Clinton Administration (1997 through 2000) were fairly similar to the first 
non-transition years of the George W. Bush Administration (2002 through 
2004). 
 
 93. Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 74, §6(a)(1). 
 94. RegInfo.gov, Where to Find Federal Regulatory Information, 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoHistoricReport (last visited May 1, 2006) (providing 
annual lists of concluded executive order reviews and statistics on OIRA’s past reviews). 
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TABLE 1: MOST RULES THAT OIRA REVIEWS ARE CODED AS 
“CHANGED”95
  
Year 
 
Number of 
proposed 
and final 
rules that  
OIRA 
reviewed 
Percentage of rules OIRA reviewed that were coded: 
Consistent 
with change 
Consistent 
without 
change 
Withdrawn Returned Other 
1994 831 37.3 53.4 4.3 0.2 4.9 
1995 620 39.0 53.1 5.2 0.5 2.3 
1996 507 51.5 41.4 5.1 0.0 2.0 
1997 505 56.0 37.4 5.1 0.8 0.6 
1998 487 59.3 36.1 3.1 0.0 1.4 
1999 587 62.2 31.5 3.1 0.0 3.2 
2000 583 60.4 34.3 3.9 0.0 1.4 
2001 700 45.6 28.1 22.0 2.6 1.7 
2002 669 54.3 31.7 7.6 0.7 5.6 
2003 715 60.3 30.3 6.9 0.3 2.2 
2004 627 62.7 29.8 6.5 0.2 0.8 
2005 610 65.4 27.0 6.6 0.2 1.0 
  
As noted previously, however, in OIRA’s database, “consistent with 
change” simply means that the rule changed while it was under formal 
review—not that it was necessarily changed as a consequence of OIRA’s 
review.  If an agency submits a new draft of a rule during this period (even 
to correct typographical errors), it is coded in the database as “changed.”  
Also, changes that OIRA may suggest outside of the formal review period 
are not reflected in these data.  For example, if a rule is changed as a 
consequence of OIRA suggestions during an “informal” review (discussed 
in more detail later), but no changes are made during review, then the rule 
would be coded as “consistent with no change.” 
The data indicate that there were a relatively large number of rules that 
were withdrawn and returned in 2001.  The withdrawn rules reflect actions 
 
 95. These data are culled from a public database that OMB publishes online.  See 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoCountsSearchInit?action=init.  To get the numbers for 
any year, enter the year (e.g. “01/01/1994” to “12/31/1994”), click the “By OIRA 
conclusion action” option, then “search.” 
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taken at the start of the George W. Bush Administration pursuant to a 
memorandum issued by Assistant to the President and former Chief of Staff 
Andrew H. Card, which generally directed Cabinet departments and 
independent agencies (1) not to send proposed or final rules to the Office of 
the Federal Register, (2) to withdraw from the Office rules that had not yet 
been published in the Federal Register, and (3) to postpone for sixty days 
the effective date of rules that had been published but had not yet taken 
effect.96  As discussed in greater detail later in this article, OIRA returned a 
number of rules to the agencies for reconsideration shortly after a new 
administrator was appointed in 2001.97
The type of review that OIRA conducts under Executive Order 12,866 
sometimes depends on the type of draft rule submitted.  For example, if the 
draft rule contains a collection of information covered by the PRA, the desk 
officer would also review it for compliance with that Act.  If the draft rule 
is “economically significant” (e.g., has an annual impact on the economy of 
at least $100 million), the executive order requires agencies to prepare an 
economic analysis describing, among other things, the alternatives that the 
agency considered and the costs and benefits of those alternatives.
 
98  For 
those economically significant rules, OIRA desk officers are to review the 
economic analyses using the office’s guidance on how to prepare 
regulatory analyses under the Executive Order.99
An attachment to a September 20, 2001, memorandum to the President’s 
Management Council described the general principles and procedures that 
OIRA reportedly uses in the implementation of Executive Order 12,866.
  
100
 
 96. Memorandum from Andrew H. Card to the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies (Jan. 20, 2001), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/regreview_plan.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).  For 
a discussion of the rules with postponed effective dates, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
GAO-02-370R, REGULATORY REVIEW: DELAY OF EFFECTIVE DATES OF FINAL RULES 
SUBJECT TO THE ADMINISTRATION’S JAN. 20, 2001 MEMORANDUM (2002). 
  
For example, the attachment indicated that the office would, where 
appropriate, (1) include an evaluation of whether the agency has conducted 
an adequate risk assessment; (2) give “a measure of deference” to 
 97. See supra notes 136-148. 
 98. Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 74, at 51,738 (defining an economically 
significant rule as adversely affecting “in a material way, the economy, a sector of the 
economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, 
local, or tribal governments or communities”). 
 99. See OMB, CIRCULAR A-4 (2003), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).  
 100. Memorandum from John D. Graham, OIRA Administrator, to the President’s Mgmt. 
Council (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/oira_review-
process.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2006). 
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regulatory impact analyses and other supporting technical documents that 
have been peer reviewed in accordance with specified procedures; (3) 
ensure that regulatory clearance packages satisfy the requirements in other 
executive orders (e.g., include the certifications required by Executive 
Order 13,132 on “Federalism” and Executive Order 13,175 on 
“Consultation and Coordination with Indian and Tribal Governments”); (4) 
consult with the Small Business Administration (SBA) and the SBA Chief 
Counsel for Advocacy; and (5) ensure that agencies evaluate the possible 
impact of the draft rule on the programs of other federal agencies.101
There is usually some type of communication during the review process 
(often via e-mail or telephone) between the OIRA desk officer and the 
rulemaking agency regarding specific issues in the draft rule.  Briefings and 
meetings are sometimes held between OIRA and the agency during the 
review process, with OIRA branch chiefs, the deputy administrator, or the 
administrator involved in some of these meetings.  According to OIRA, the 
desk officers always consult with the relevant resource management office 
on the “budget side” of OMB as part of their reviews, and reviews of draft 
rules are not completed until those offices sign off.
  
102  If the draft rule is 
economically significant, the desk officer would also consult with a 
government economist to help review the required economic analysis.103  
For other rules, the desk officer might consult with other OIRA staff on 
issues involving statistics and surveys, information technology and 
systems, or privacy issues.104
As noted previously, Executive Order 12,866 requires OIRA to complete 
its regulatory reviews within certain timeframes—(1) within ten working 
days of submission for any preliminary actions prior to a notice of 
proposed rulemaking (e.g., a notice of inquiry or an advance notice of 
proposed rulemaking) or (2) within ninety calendar days of submission for 
all other regulatory actions (or forty-five days if OIRA had previously 
reviewed the material).
  In certain cases, OIRA may circulate a draft 
rule to other parts of the Executive Office of the President (e.g., the Office 
of Science and Technology Policy or the Council on Environmental 
Quality) or other agencies (e.g., the Departments of Energy, the Interior, or 
Transportation for certain EPA rules).   
105
 
 101. Id. 
  In some instances, however, agency officials 
said OIRA will ask the rulemaking agency to withdraw the rule and 
 102. Interview with OIRA representatives, in Old Executive Office Building, 
Washington, D.C. (2003).  See note 38 supra. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Exec. Order 12,866, supra note 74, at 51,739. 
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resubmit it, restarting the review period.106  The Executive Order does not 
permit OIRA to “approve” or “disapprove” a draft rule; it is up to the 
agency to decide whether to proceed with publication of a rule after it had 
been returned, or to accept OIRA’s suggested changes.  OIRA 
representatives describe this as an iterative process in which the agencies 
and OIRA negotiate issues and clarify terms.107
OIRA’S INFORMAL REVIEWS  
  Nevertheless, agencies 
very rarely publish rules that OIRA returns or ignore substantive OIRA 
“suggestions.”  In some instances, agency officials will formally or 
informally appeal OIRA determinations to the White House.  
For some rules, there is an additional phase of “informal review” before 
the rule is officially submitted to OIRA.108  In its December 2001 report on 
the costs and benefits of federal regulations, OIRA stated that the office’s 
original review process “was designed as an end-of-the-pipeline check 
against poorly conceived regulations.”109  OIRA also said, however, that by 
the time an agency formally submits a rule to OIRA for review, there may 
be “strong institutional momentum” behind the proposal and, as a result, 
the agency may be reluctant to address certain issues that OIRA analysts 
might raise.110  Therefore, OIRA indicated that “there is value in promoting 
a role for OIRA’s analytic perspective earlier in the process, before the 
agency becomes too entrenched.”111
A common yet informal practice is for agencies to share preliminary 
drafts of rules and/or analyses with OIRA desk officers prior to formal 
decision making at the agency.  This practice is useful for agencies since 
they have the opportunity to educate OIRA desk officers in a more patient 
way, before the formal 90-day review clock at OMB begins to tick.  The 
practice is also useful for OIRA analysts because they have the 
opportunity to flag serious problems early enough to facilitate correction 
before the agency’s position is irreversible.
  OIRA went on to state the following: 
112
OIRA cannot informally review each of the hundreds of significant 
proposed and final rules that are submitted to the office each year.  
  
 
 106. Interview with OIRA officials, in Old Executive Office Building, Washington, D.C. 
(2003).  See note 38 supra. 
 107. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 81. 
 108. Id. at 30. 
 109. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, MAKING SENSE OF REGULATION: 2001 REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON THE COST AND BENEFITS OF REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON 
STATE, LOCAL AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 43 (2001). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
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Informal reviews are most common when there is a statutory or legal 
deadline for a rule, or when the rule is extremely large and requires 
discussion with other federal agencies besides OMB.  EPA and the 
Departments of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and 
Transportation often issue those types of rules, and therefore are more 
likely to have their rules reviewed informally before formal submission.   
Informal review can be much more important in the rule-development 
process than formal reviews, and can last much longer.  For example, on 
October 30, 2001, EPA sent a draft proposed rule to OIRA in which the 
agency proposed that nonconformance penalties be made available for the 
2004 and later model year non-methane hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides 
standard for heavy-duty diesel engines and vehicles.113  To determine 
penalty amounts, EPA used a three percent discount rate in calculating 
certain compliance and fuel costs.114  During the next six weeks, EPA sent 
at least three other versions of the rule to OIRA for “informal review.”115  
Throughout this period, OIRA suggested using a seven percent discount 
rate instead of three percent, which would have the effect of reducing the 
penalty amounts cited in the rule.116  By the time EPA submitted the rule to 
OIRA for formal review on December 10, 2001, EPA switched to the seven 
percent rate.117  OMB completed its review on December 20, 2001.118  The 
informal review period lasted four times as long as the formal period (at 
least forty-one days versus ten days) and most of the substantive changes to 
the rule appear to have occurred during informal review.119  In other cases, 
the formal OIRA review period for significant rules was as short as one 
day.120
OIRA has informally reviewed agencies’ draft rules since its review 
function was established in 1981, but informal reviews reportedly became 
more common when Executive Order 12,866 was adopted in 1993 and 
 
 
 113. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 189-91. 
 114. Id. at 163. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 47 (“[T]he formal review period itself may be somewhat of an artificial 
construct.”). 
 120. Id. at 175.  For example, OIRA formally reviewed a joint rule defining “fill 
material” under the Clean Water Act that had been developed by EPA and the Department 
of the Army’s Corps of Engineers in one day—from May 1, 2002, until May 2, 2002.  The 
agencies made a number of changes to the rule at OIRA’s suggestion, indicating that the 
rule had been reviewed extensively before it was formally submitted.  See Final Revisions to 
the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definitions of “Fill Material” and “Discharge of Fill 
Material,” 67 Fed. Reg. 31,129 (May 9, 2002). 
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OIRA’s reviews were focused on “significant” rules.121  OIRA appears to 
have increased its use of informal reviews even further in recent years.  For 
example, in its March 2002 draft report to Congress on the costs and 
benefits of federal regulation, OIRA wrote, “agencies are beginning to 
invite OIRA staff into earlier phases of regulatory development in order to 
prevent returns late in the rulemaking process.  It is at these early stages 
where OIRA’s analytic approach can most improve on the quality of 
regulatory analyses and the substance of rules.”122  Separately, in 2002, the 
OIRA Administrator stated, “an increasing number of agencies are 
becoming more receptive to early discussions with OMB, at least on highly 
significant rulemakings.”123
The OIRA Administrator also indicated that agencies’ “receptivity” to 
informal reviews may be enhanced by the possibility of a returned rule.  
For example, in early 2002, he said that OIRA was trying to: 
 
[c]reate an incentive for agencies to come to us when they know they 
have something that in the final analysis is going to be something we’re 
going to be looking at carefully.  And I think that agencies that wait until 
the last minute and then come to us—well, in a sense, they’re rolling the 
dice.124
EFFECTS OF OIRA’S REVIEWS 
 
Although a great deal has been written about OIRA’s reviews of 
agencies’ draft rules, few studies have systematically tried to determine the 
extent to which the office’s reviews result in substantive changes to the 
rules.  One such study concluded that OIRA’s reviews resulted in the 
rejection of some regulations that would have been economically 
inefficient, but did not appear to have improved the cost-effectiveness (e.g., 
costs-per-life saved) of many of the rules.125
 
 121. Interview with OIRA representatives, in Old Executive Office Building, 
Washington, D.C. (2003).  See note 
  Other studies have used 
OIRA’s database showing the number of rules that were coded as 
“consistent with change” and “consistent without change” in an attempt to 
38 supra. 
 122. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of 
Federal Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 15,014, 15,018 (Mar. 28, 2002), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/cbreport.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2006). 
 123. John D. Graham, Remarks Prepared for the American Hospital Association (July 17, 
2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/graham_ama071702.html (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2006).  
 124. Rebecca Adams, Regulating the Rulemakers: John Graham at OIRA, CQ WEEKLY, 
Feb. 23, 2002, 520-26. 
 125. SCOTT FARROW, BROOKINGS INST., IMPROVING REGULATORY PERFORMANCE: DOES 
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OVERSIGHT MATTER? 24 (2000). 
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determine the significance of OIRA’s effects on agencies’ rules, and on 
whether those effects have changed over time.126
As discussed previously, however, the “consistent with change” code 
includes changes made at the initiation of the agencies, as well as changes 
suggested by OIRA.  Also, the code does not differentiate between minor 
editorial changes and changes that radically alter the effect of the rule.  In 
addition, the terms “returns” and “withdrawals” in OIRA’s database require 
careful consideration.  A return may be made for purely administrative 
reasons, not for substantive OIRA objections.  Conversely, an agency’s 
withdrawal of a rule may have been initiated by OIRA.  Therefore, in order 
to use these data effectively, researchers should examine the associated 
documentation in the agencies’ and OIRA’s rulemaking dockets. 
 
GAO’S ANALYSIS OF OIRA’S EFFECTS 
GAO published such an analysis in September 2003, supplementing 
information from OMB’s database with information in the dockets and 
through interviews with agency officials.127  GAO reported that, from July 
1, 2001 through June 30, 2002, OIRA completed 642 reviews of agencies’ 
draft proposed and final rules.128
• About thirty-three percent (214) were coded in the database as 
“consistent with no change,” indicating that OIRA considered the rules as 
submitted consistent with Executive Order 12,866.
  Of these: 
129
• About fifty percent (322) were coded as “consistent with change,” 
indicating that the rules had changed after being submitted to OIRA, and 
that OIRA subsequently concluded that the rule was consistent with the 
Executive Order’s requirements.
  
130
• About eight percent (fifty) were coded as “withdrawn” by the 
agency.
   
131
• About three percent (twenty-one) were coded as “returned” to the 
agency by OIRA.
  
132
• About five percent (thirty-five) had some other disposition (e.g., “sent 
improperly,” “emergency,” or “statutory or judicial deadline”).
  
133
 
 126. See, e.g., Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical 
Investigation, 70 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 821-885, 843-45  (2003). 
   
 127. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 27. 
 128. Id. at 69. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 70. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
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In order to make its review manageable, GAO focused on eight-five of 
those rules that were coded as changed, withdrawn, or returned, and that 
were submitted to OIRA by nine selected health, safety, or environmental 
agencies or offices: the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service within 
the Department of Agriculture; the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
within the Department of Health and Human Services; the Occupational 
Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) within the Department of Labor; 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Federal Motor Carrier 
Safety Administration, and the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) within the Department of Transportation (DOT); 
and the offices of air and radiation, water, solid waste, and emergency 
response within EPA.134  Seventy-one of the eighty-five rules had been 
coded “consistent with change,” nine were coded as “returned,” and five 
were coded as “withdrawn.”135
OIRA’S IMPACT ON RULES  
  
GAO’s analysis of the underlying documents indicated that OIRA had a 
significant effect on at least twenty-five of the eighty-five draft rules.136
• Of the seventy-one “changed” rules, GAO concluded that OIRA had 
suggested significant changes to seventeen of them—changes that affected 
the scope, impact, or estimated costs or benefits of the rules as originally 
submitted.
  
Specifically: 
137  In general, the focus of OIRA’s suggested changes appeared 
to be on reducing regulatory burden (and, in some cases, the expected 
benefits as well).138  For example, at OIRA’s recommendation, EPA 
removed manganese from a list of hazardous wastes, deleted certain types 
of engines from coverage of a rule setting emissions standards, and delayed 
the compliance dates for two other types of emissions.139  Of the remaining 
fifty-four “changed” rules, the most significant alterations made at OIRA’s 
suggestion involved adding explanatory language to the preambles of the 
rules and asking for comment on particular provisions.  In twenty of the 
fifty-four rules, OIRA suggested only minor editorial changes (e.g., 
correcting spelling errors or citations), or made no suggestions at all.140
• Of the nine rules that had been returned to the agencies by OIRA 
  
 
 134. Id. at 71. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 72. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 84. 
 139. Id. at 191-92. 
 140. Id. at 79. 
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during the review period, two were returned because they had been 
improperly submitted, not because of substantive defects.141  OIRA 
returned the remaining seven rules because of concerns about the agencies’ 
regulatory analyses or a perceived lack of coordination between rulemaking 
agencies.142  For example, OIRA returned one EPA rule because the 
agency did not provide a quantitative analysis of costs and benefits, and 
returned a NHTSA rule because OIRA did not believe that the agency had 
demonstrated that it had selected the best available alternative.143  Five of 
the seven rules returned for substantive reasons had been submitted by the 
FAA.144
• Of the five rules that were withdrawn, GAO determined that only one 
had been withdrawn primarily at OIRA’s suggestion.
  
145  The other four 
rules were withdrawn solely at the agencies’ initiative or as a result of a 
mutual decision by the agencies and OIRA.146
OIRA review had a greater effect on certain agencies’ rules than others.  
As Table 2 illustrates, OIRA had a significant effect on thirteen (seventy-
six percent) of the twenty-two rules submitted by EPA’s Office of Air and 
Radiation and Office of Water (i.e., changes to the scope, impact, and 
estimated costs and benefits of the rules).  In contrast, OIRA had a 
significant effect on only four (eight percent) of the forty-nine rules 
submitted by other agencies and offices.  In these cases, OIRA review most 
frequently resulted in additional explanatory language in the rules’ 
preambles, requests for comments on particular provisions, or minor 
editorial changes.  
  
 
TABLE 2: EPA AIR/RADIATION AND WATER RULES WERE MOST 
AFFECTED BY OIRA REVIEW147
  
  
Agency 
 
Rules where changes suggested by OIRA 
were: 
  
  
Total Significant Material Minor/None 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 80. 
 144. Id. at 79. 
 145. Id. at 81. 
 146. Id. 
 147. These data were prepared by the author as a summary of general research to be 
included in a 2003 GAO report.  See GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 75. 
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EPA Office of Air and 
Radiation 
7 4 3 14 
EPA Office of Water 6 2 0 8 
All other agencies and offices in 
review 
4 28 17 49 
Total 17 34 20 71 
 
Although this GAO study highlights the effects that OIRA can have on 
agencies’ rules, it also probably understates the influence that OIRA has on 
agencies’ rules because the findings were often limited to the 
documentation that was available in agencies and OIRA’s dockets.  As 
noted previously, if OIRA suggested a change to a rule before it was 
formally submitted to OIRA (i.e., during informal review), GAO’s analysis 
might not reflect those changes.  In fact, if a rule was significantly changed 
by OIRA during several rounds of informal review, but was unchanged 
during formal review, it would not have even been in the universe of rules 
that GAO examined (i.e., those coded in the OIRA database as changed, 
returned, or withdrawn during OIRA’s formal review).  Other forms of 
OIRA influence on rulemaking may be even more indirect and harder to 
document.  For example, some agencies have indicated that they do not 
even propose certain regulatory provisions because they believe that OIRA 
would find them objectionable.148
REGULATED ENTITIES’ CONTACTS WITH OIRA  
  
GAO also reported in its study that regulated entities directly contacted 
OIRA either before or during its review process regarding eleven of the 
twenty-five rules that OIRA significantly affected.149  Eight of those eleven 
cases involved EPA rules, and the nature of the contacts ranged from 
meetings with OIRA representatives to letters sent to OIRA.150
 
 148. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-GGD-96-185, REGULATORY REFORM: 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REGULATORY REVIEW EXECUTIVE ORDER 10 (1996) [hereinafter 
GAO, REGULATORY REFORM].  DOT officials told GAO that they will not even propose 
certain regulatory provisions because they know that OIRA will find them unacceptable.  Id. 
  In seven of 
the eleven cases, GAO concluded that what OIRA ultimately recommended 
to the rulemaking agencies was akin to what these regulated parties 
recommended to OIRA—in some cases, using similar language to that used 
 149. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 89.  Environmental and public interest groups 
also contacted OIRA regarding three of the rules.  Id. 
 150. Id. 
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by the regulated entities.151
• During OIRA’s review of an EPA rule on identification and listing of 
hazardous waste, industry representatives met with, and sent letters to 
OIRA opposing the listing of manganese as a hazardous waste 
constituent (the industry representatives had made essentially the same 
argument to EPA during the public comment phase, but EPA did not 
agree).
  Some examples include the following: 
152  The main focus of OIRA’s comments to EPA at the conclusion 
of its review was that final action on listing manganese as a hazardous 
contaminant should be deferred.153
• Representatives of automobile manufacturers contacted OIRA and 
argued that a NHTSA draft final rule on tire pressure monitoring systems 
should have permitted the use of indirect, as well as direct, sensing 
technologies (not just direct technologies, as in the draft rule).
 
154  OIRA 
returned the rule to NHTSA for reconsideration, questioning whether the 
agency had selected the best available regulatory option.  OIRA later 
approved (as “consistent with no change”) a resubmitted rule that allowed 
either direct or indirect technologies until 2006.155
Notwithstanding the congruence between the comments of the regulated 
entities and OIRA’s comments, GAO said it was impossible to determine 
the extent to which these or other suggestions made by the regulated 
entities might have influenced OIRA’s actions, if at all.
  
156
 
CHANGES IN OIRA’S POLICIES AND PRACTICES DURING THE GEORGE 
W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
  For example, 
OIRA may have independently reached the same conclusions as the 
regulated entities. 
The formal process by which OIRA reviews agencies’ draft rules has 
 
 151. Id. at 91. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id.  In August 2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated this 
rule as inconsistent with the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and 
Documentation (TREAD) Act upon which it was based.  See Public Citizen, Inc. v. Mineta, 
340 F. 3d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 2003).  NHTSA issued a new final rule on April 8, 2005.  See 
Rules and Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 18,129, 18,136 (Apr. 8, 2005).  According to one 
observer, the rule as initially provided to OIRA may have survived judicial review.  See 
Cindy Skrzycki, Public Citizen, Bridgestone Fight Tire Rule, WASH. POST, Jun. 21, 2005, at 
D1. 
 156. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 91-92. 
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changed little since Executive Order 12,866 was issued in 1993.157  There 
have, however, been several subtle yet notable changes in OIRA policies 
and practices in recent years—particularly after OIRA Administrator John 
D. Graham took office in July 2001.  In October 2002, Administrator 
Graham said, “the changes we are making at OMB in pursuit of smarter 
regulation are not headline grabbers: No far-reaching legislative initiatives, 
no rhetoric-laden executive orders, and no campaigns of regulatory relief.  
Yet we are making some changes that we believe will have a long-lasting 
impact on the regulatory state.”158
RETURN OF THE “GATEKEEPER” ROLE 
  
As noted previously, during the Reagan Administration, OIRA was often 
criticized for acting as a regulatory “gatekeeper,” actively overseeing and 
recommending changes to agencies’ rules.159  During the Clinton 
Administration, however, the opposite concerns were expressed.  A number 
of observers criticized OIRA for not overseeing the actions of the 
rulemaking agencies more aggressively.160  In September 1996, OIRA 
Administrator Sally Katzen testified that “we have consciously changed the 
way we relate to the agencies,” and described OIRA’s relationship with the 
rulemaking agencies as “collegial” and “constructive.”161  She also said she 
agreed with an article which stated that OIRA functioned during that period 
“more as a counselor during the review process than as an enforcer of the 
executive order.”162
During the George W. Bush Administration, OIRA has returned to the 
role it assumed during the Reagan Administration, even describing itself in 
an annual report as the “gatekeeper for new rulemakings.”
  
163
 
 157. There has been only one amendment to Executive Order 12,866 since it was issued.  
As mentioned earlier, Executive Order 13,258 reassigned all roles originally assigned to the 
Vice President in Executive Order 12,866 (e.g., principal advisor to the President on 
regulatory policy, planning, and review) to the President’s Chief of Staff.  See supra note 
  OIRA 
78 
and accompanying text. 
 158. John D. Graham, OIRA Administrator, Presidential Oversight of the Regulatory 
State: Can It Work?, Address before the Heinz School, Carnegie Mellon University (Oct. 4, 
2002). 
 159. See, e.g., EADS & FIX, supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 160. See, e.g., GATTUSO, supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 161. See Oversight of Regulatory Review Activities of the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs: Hearing before the U.S. Subcomm. on Financial Management & 
Accountability of the H. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong. (1996).  
 162. William Niskanen, Clinton’s Regulatory Record: Policies, Process, and Outcomes, 
19 REGULATION 3, 27-28, (1996). 
 163. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, STIMULATING SMARTER REGULATION: 2002 REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED 
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Administrator Graham has said that one of the office’s functions is “to 
protect people from poorly designed rules,” and that OIRA review is a way 
to “combat the tunnel vision that plagues the thinking of single-mission 
regulators.”164  He has also compared OIRA’s review of agencies’ rules to 
OMB’s role in reviewing agencies’ budget requests.165
INCREASED (AND THEN DECREASED) USE OF RETURN LETTERS 
  This “return to the 
gatekeeper” perspective of OIRA’s role has implications for an array of 
OIRA’s functions, and underlies many of the other changes described 
below. 
As indicated Table 1, during the Clinton Administration, OIRA only 
rarely returned rules to the agencies for reconsideration.166  Specifically, 
according to OIRA’s database, of the more than 4,000 rules that OIRA 
reviewed from 1994 through 2000, OIRA returned only seven rules to the 
agencies—three in 1995 and four in 1997.  OIRA Administrators during 
that period said they viewed the use of return letters as evidence of the 
failure of the collaborative review process, since OIRA and the agencies 
were part of the same presidential administration.167
In contrast, OIRA Administrator Graham referred to return letters as the 
office’s “ultimate weapon,” viewing them as a way to make clear that the 
office is serious about the review process.
 
168  In the first six months after 
he took office in July 2001, OIRA returned eighteen draft rules to the 
agencies for reconsideration.169  DOT had the most rules returned during 
2001 and 2002 (eight), followed by the Social Security Administration 
(five) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (four).170
 
MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 14 (2002).  
  The letters 
 164. John D. Graham, OIRA Administrator, Remarks to the Board of Trustees, The 
Keystone Ctr., Washington, D.C., Jun. 18, 2002, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/keystone_speech061802.html (last visited Apr. 21, 
2006). 
 165. John D. Graham, OIRA Administrator, Remarks prepared for delivery to the 
National Economists Club, Presidential Management of the Regulatory State, Mar. 7, 2002, 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/testimony/graham030702.html (last 
visited Apr. 27, 2006). 
 166. See supra tbl.1. 
 167. See GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 42-43. 
 168. John D. Graham, OIRA Administrator, Remarks prepared for the American Hospital 
Association, Stimulating Smarter Regulation: OMB’s Role, July 17, 2002, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/graham_ama071702.html (last visited Apr. 27, 
2006). 
 169. See GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 41-42. 
 170. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, OIRA Return Letters, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/return_letter.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).  
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commonly indicated that OIRA returned the rules because of concerns 
about the agencies’ analyses (e.g., questioning whether the agencies had 
considered all reasonable alternatives or had selected the alternative that 
would yield the greatest net benefits).171
Subsequently, however, the pace of OIRA’s return letters slowed 
dramatically.  Although the average number of rules that OIRA reviewed 
each month stayed about the same, in the four years from March 2002 until 
March 2006, OIRA returned a total of six draft rules to the agencies—a 
dramatic decline from the twenty-one returns during Administrator 
Graham’s first eight months in office.
  
172  Only one rule was returned in 
2004, and one more in 2005—keeping about the same pace as the Clinton 
administration.  OIRA officials attributed the decline in return letters to the 
improved quality of agencies’ regulatory submissions after the initial flurry 
of returns.173  For example, in his November 2005 comments marking the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of OIRA, Administrator Graham said, “we rarely 
need to issue a return letter” because agencies now “work with us to fix 
problems or they persuade us that there is no problem to fix.”174
ADVENT (AND THEN DECLINE) OF PROMPT LETTERS  
  
OIRA has traditionally been a reactive force in the rulemaking process, 
commenting on draft proposed and final rules that are generated by the 
agencies.  Although OIRA occasionally suggested regulatory topics to the 
agencies during previous administrations, the practice was relatively 
uncommon and the discussions were not made public.  In contrast, OIRA 
Administrator Graham was more publicly proactive, sending several 
agencies “prompt letters” (and posting them on the OIRA web site) 
suggesting that they develop regulations in a particular area or encouraging 
the agencies’ ongoing efforts.175  For example, one such letter encouraged 
NHTSA to give greater priority to modifying its frontal occupant protection 
standard, and another letter suggested that OSHA make the promotion of 
automatic external heart defibrillators a higher priority.176
 
 171. See id. 
  Other prompt 
 172. See id.  Two of the five returns during this period involved the same DOT rule. 
 173. Interviews with OMB officials, in Old Executive Office Building, Washington, D.C. 
(2003).  See note 38 supra. 
 174. JOHN GRAHAM, AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CTR. FOR REGULATORY STUDIES, THE 
“SMART-REGULATION” AGENDA: PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES 5 (2005) [hereinafter 
GRAHAM, SMART REGULATION]. 
 175. For sample OIRA prompt letters, see Office of Mgmt. & Budget, OIRA Prompt 
Letters, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/prompt_letter.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2006). 
 176. Letter from John D. Graham, OIRA Administrator, to the Honorable Michael P. 
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letters recommended that the agencies better focus certain research or 
programs, and some made no recommendations at all.177  Several of the 
agencies took action in response to the letters, but few new rulemakings 
have directly resulted from them.  For example, one of OIRA’s first prompt 
letters urged FDA to give greater priority to issuing a rule on the trans-fatty 
acid content of foods.178  Although OIRA Administrator Graham cited the 
issuance of an FDA rule on trans-fats as an illustration of the effect of the 
prompt letters, he also noted that the rulemaking had begun during the 
previous administration.179
OIRA sent agencies four prompt letters in September 2001, six by the 
end of that year, and a total of at least thirteen by the end of 2003.
  
180  Since 
then, however, the number of prompt letter has diminished substantially.  
OIRA issued only two prompt letters in 2004, and none were issued in 
2005.181
INCREASED EMPHASIS ON ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (USUALLY) 
  It is not clear why OIRA’s use of prompt letters has declined so 
sharply.  However, it is possible that OIRA may have reverted back to its 
previous approach of making more private rulemaking and regulatory 
suggestions to the agencies.  
Although OIRA has always encouraged agencies to provide well-
developed economic analyses for their draft rules, Administrator Graham 
expressed greater interest in this issue than his predecessors.  Also, 
according to agency officials, there was a perceptible “stepping up the bar” 
in the amount of support required for their rules, with OIRA reportedly 
more often looking for regulatory benefits to be quantified and a cost-
 
Jackson, Deputy Secretary, Dep’t of Transp. (Dec. 7, 2001), available at 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/nhsta_prompt120701.html (last visited Apr. 21, 
2006); see also Letter from John D. Graham, OIRA Administrator, to the Honorable John 
Henshaw, Assistant Secretary of Labor, Occupation Safety & Health Admin. (Sept. 18, 
2001), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/osha_prompt_letter.html (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2006). 
 177. For example, one such letter was essentially a press release that touted an effort by 
OIRA and EPA in which they worked together to develop a proposed rule on non-road 
diesel engines.  See Env’tl Protection Agency, EPA and OMB Working To Speed the 
Reduction of Pollution From Nonroad Diesel Engines 1 (June 7, 2002), available at 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/r-117.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2006). 
 178. Letter from John D. Graham, OIRA Administrator, to the Honorable Tommy G. 
Thompson, Sec’y of Health & Human Serv. (Sept. 18, 2001), available at 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/hhs_prompt_letter.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2006). 
 179. GRAHAM, SMART REGULATION,  supra note 174, at 5-6.  
 180. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 48. 
 181. See OIRA Prompt Letters, supra note 175.  OIRA most recently issued a prompt 
letter to EPA in April 2006, which was the first since November 2004.  Id. 
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benefit analysis for every regulatory option that the agency considered, not 
just the option selected.182  In September 2003, OIRA published OMB 
Circular A-4, which contained guidelines for economic analysis under the 
Executive Order that updated the “best practices” guidelines issued in 
January 1996.183  The new economic analysis guidelines were generally 
similar to the earlier guidance, but differed in several key areas—e.g., 
encouraging agencies to (1) perform both cost-effectiveness and cost-
benefit analyses in support of their major rules,184 (2) use multiple discount 
rates when the benefits and costs of rules are expected to occur in different 
time periods, and (3) use a formal probability analysis of benefits and costs 
when a rule is expected to have more than a $1 billion impact on the 
economy (unless the effects of the rule are clear).185
In its December 2005 report to Congress on the costs and benefits of 
federal regulations, OMB asserted that, “[r]egulation that is based on solid 
economic analysis and sound science is also more likely to provide greater 
benefits to society at less cost than regulation that is not.”
  
186
 
 182. See GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 
  However, 
OIRA has also signaled that these analyses are sometimes difficult if not 
impossible to conduct for certain types of rules.  For example, as OIRA 
Administrator Graham said in November 2005, “[h]omeland security 
regulations account for about half of our major-rule costs in 2004 but we do 
not yet have a feasible way to fully quantify benefits.  A moment’s 
reflection will reveal some of the perplexing issues: how do we identify 
targets of potential terrorist attacks, the probability of attacks and 
associated damages, and the effectiveness of various countermeasures in 
6, at 44-45. 
 183. See OMB, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 99. 
 184. Cost-benefit analysis involves the systematic identification of all costs and benefits 
associated with a forthcoming regulation.  Cost-effectiveness analysis seeks to determine 
how a given goal can be achieved at the least cost.  In contrast to cost-benefit analysis, the 
concern in cost-effectiveness analysis is not with weighing the merits of the goal, but with 
identifying and analyzing the costs of alternatives to reach that goal (e.g., dollars per life 
saved). 
 185. See OMB, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 99.  Discounting can have a significant effect 
on the present value of future health benefits.  For example, in a February 2003 speech, 
Administrator Graham noted that the present value of 1,000 lives saved fifty years in the 
future is only thirty-four lives in present value when evaluated at a seven percent discount 
rate.  See John D. Graham, OIRA Administrator, Valuing Health: An OMB Perspective, 
Remarks Prepared for the Conference on Valuing Health Outcomes: An Assessment of 
Approaches (Feb. 13, 2003), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/rff_speech_feb13.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2006). 
 186. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, VALIDATING REGULATORY ANALYSIS: 2005 REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATION AND UNFUNDED 
MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 33 (2005) [hereinafter OMB, 
VALIDATING REGULATORY ANALYSIS]. 
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reducing risk?”187  Administrator Graham reportedly said that cost-benefit 
analysis may not be appropriate for these homeland security rules, and that 
a more practical “soft” test was being used for them.188
Some observers have questioned why assessments of costs or benefits 
for these homeland security rules are qualitatively different from, or more 
difficult than, assessing the costs and benefits associated with many health, 
safety, or environmental rules, and therefore why these homeland security 
rules appear to be less rigorously reviewed by OIRA.  In the words of Sally 
Katzen, OIRA Administrator during the Clinton Administration: “So when 
it matters to them to get rules out quickly, they wink and blink.  But in 
areas of public health and safety, where they have longstanding relations 
with the business communities involved, they’re insistent on satisfying 
these standards.”
   
189
INCREASED TRANSPARENCY (SOMEWHAT) 
  
As noted previously, many of the longstanding concerns about OIRA’s 
role in the rulemaking process have centered on the perceived lack of 
transparency of its reviews.190  Executive Order 12,866 attempted to 
address some of those concerns by requiring that, after a rule is published, 
an agency must disclose the changes it made to the rule during OIRA’s 
review, and the changes it made at the suggestion or recommendation of 
OIRA.191  This Executive Order requires OIRA to maintain a publicly 
available log disclosing the status of all regulatory actions under review, 
and the names and dates of those involved in substantive oral 
communications (e.g., meetings and telephone calls) between OIRA staff 
and parties outside of the executive branch.192
In October 2001, Administrator Graham published a memorandum to 
OIRA staff on the office’s web site that extended the Executive Order’s 
  These requirements 
notwithstanding, concerns about the lack of transparency continued.  For 
example, even after issuance of the executive order, OIRA disclosed 
contacts with outside parties only if they occurred during the office’s 
sometimes brief formal review period, not if they occurred during its 
informal reviews.  
 
 187. GRAHAM, SMART REGULATION, supra note 174, at 8. 
 188. See Nancy Ognanovich, Head of OMB Regulatory Office Says Analyzing Homeland 
Security Rules Difficult, BNA DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Nov. 8, 2005, at A39.  
 189. Rebecca Adams, Graham Leaves OIRA With a Full Job Jar, CQ WEEKLY, Jan. 23, 
2006, at 226. 
 190. See, e.g., GAO, REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 148, at 8. 
 191. Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 74, at 51,739. 
 192. Id. 
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disclosure requirements in several areas. 193 For example, the memorandum 
said that OIRA would disclose substantive meetings and other contacts 
with outside parties about a rule under review even if OIRA was only 
informally reviewing the rule,194 and that it would disclose substantive 
telephone calls with outside parties that were initiated by the Administrator, 
not just calls initiated by outside parties.195  Further, OIRA announced that 
it would be expanding its web site, posting lists of regulations currently 
under review,196 reviews it concluded in the previous thirty days,197 and its 
meeting records with outside parties.198
As discussed in more detail later in this Article, however, OIRA’s 
regulatory reviews are still far from transparent.  Agencies are still 
instructed not to disclose changes that OIRA suggests during informal 
reviews, and the meeting log on OIRA’s web site does not clearly delineate 
the subjects of OIRA’s outside meetings or the affiliations of those present 
at the meetings.
   
199
CHANGES IN OIRA STAFFING 
  Also, as noted previously, OIRA’s database showing 
rules “changed” during its review is not an accurate indication of the rules 
that were substantively changed by OIRA. 
When OIRA was created in fiscal year 1981, the office had a “full-time 
equivalent” (FTE) ceiling of ninety staff members.200
 
 193. Memorandum from John D. Graham, Administrator, for OIRA Staff (Oct. 18, 2001), 
available at 
  By 1997, OIRA’s 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/oira_disclosure_memo-b.html (last 
visited May 23, 2006). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Executive Order Submission Under Review, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/library/OMBREGSP.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2006). 
 197. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Executive Order Review in the Last 30 Days, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/library/OMBREGSC.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2006). 
 198. For a list of OIRA’s meetings with outside parties, see Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 
Meeting Records, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/oira/meetings.html (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2006).  For a list of OMB’s oral communications, see Office of Mgmt. & 
Budget, Oral Communications Record, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/oira/oral_communications.html (last visited Apr. 18, 
2006).  
 199. To view OIRA’s meeting log, see 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/oira/meetings.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2006).  As GAO 
indicated in its 2003 report, OIRA’s descriptions of its contacts with outside parties did not 
always clearly indicate what rule was being discussed or what organizations those parties 
represented. 
 200. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 59.  FTE data are typically used in a budgetary 
context, and are a useful way to compare staffing strength over time or across entities.  For 
example, one employee working forty hours per week for a year would be considered one 
FTE, and two employees who each work twenty hours a week for a year would also be 
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FTE allocation had declined to forty-seven—a nearly fifty percent 
reduction.201  Although Executive Order 12,866 (issued in late 1993) 
permitted OIRA to focus its resources on “significant” rules, this decline in 
OIRA staffing also occurred during a period in which regulatory agencies’ 
staffing and budgetary levels were increasing and OIRA was given a 
number of new statutory responsibilities.202
Starting in 2001, OIRA’s staffing authorization began to increase 
somewhat, and by 2003 it stood at fifty-five FTEs.
 
203  Between 2001 and 
2003, OIRA hired five new staff members in such fields as epidemiology, 
risk assessment, engineering, and health economics.  OIRA representatives 
indicated that these new hires reflected the increasing importance of 
science-based regulation in federal agencies, and would enable OIRA to 
ask penetrating technical questions about agency proposals.204
OIRA’S OTHER STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
In addition to its regulatory review responsibilities under Executive 
Order 12,866, and its multiple responsibilities under the Paperwork 
Reduction Act (including paperwork review, information resources 
management, statistical policy and coordination, records management, 
privacy and security, and information technology), Congress has assigned 
OIRA a number of other specific functions related to the rulemaking and 
regulatory process.  For example: 
• The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 generally requires 
agencies to prepare written statements describing the effects of their rules 
that are subject to the Act’s requirements on state, local, and tribal 
governments, and the private sector.205  The Act requires the director of 
OMB to collect those written statements and provide them to the 
Congressional Budget Office, to establish pilot programs to test innovative 
regulatory approaches, and to prepare an annual report on the 
implementation of the act.206
 
considered one FTE. 
  The OMB director has delegated these 
responsibilities to OIRA.  
 201. Id. 
 202. See Regulatory Right-to-Know Act of 1999, 31 U.S.C. § 1105 (2000); Small 
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000); Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1532 (2000).  These acts assigned OIRA various 
duties, which are further discussed in notes 205-209 infra and accompanying text. 
 203. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 60. 
 204. Interview with OIRA representatives, in Old Executive Office Building, 
Washington, D.C. (2003).  See note 38 supra. 
 205. See Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 § 1532. 
 206. Id. 
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• The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 
(SBREFA) requires EPA and OSHA to convene “advocacy review panels” 
before publishing proposed rules expected to have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities.207  The Act specifically 
requires the review panel to include full-time employees from OIRA, as 
well as other agencies.208
• SBREFA also contains provisions commonly referred to as the 
“Congressional Review Act,” which (among other things) requires agencies 
to delay the effective date of “major” rules, and requires GAO to submit a 
report on those rules within fifteen days of their issuance.
  
209
•  The Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for 2001, 
generally known as the “Data Quality Act” or the “Information Quality 
Act,” directed OMB to take several actions, all of which were delegated to 
OIRA.
  SBREFA 
defines a major rule as one that the OIRA administrator concludes has 
resulted or is likely to result in (among other things) a $100 million annual 
effect on the economy. 
210  Specifically, the Act required OMB to issue government-wide 
guidelines that “provide policy and procedural guidance to Federal 
agencies for ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and 
integrity of information (including statistical information) disseminated by 
Federal agencies.”211  OMB published those guidelines in final form on 
February 22, 2002.212  The Act also required agencies to develop their own 
guidelines (which were reviewed by OMB), and to report to OMB on the 
number and nature of complaints received and the manner in which such 
complaints were handled by the agency.213
• Section 624 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations 
Act of 2001, sometimes known as the “Regulatory Right-to-Know Act,” 
requires OMB to prepare and submit with the budget an annual “accounting 
statement and associated report” containing an estimate of the costs and 
benefits (including quantifiable and non-quantifiable effects) of federal 
   
 
 207. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act § 244.  
 208. Id. 
 209. For a more complete discussion of the Congressional Review Act, see Morton 
Rosenberg, Whatever Happened to Congressional Review of Agency Rulemaking?: A Brief 
Overview, Assessment, and Proposal for Reform, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1051, 1092 (1999). 
 210. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 2001, 44 U.S.C. § 3516 
(2001). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, 
Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 8,451 (Feb. 22, 2002). 
 213. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 2001 § 3516. 
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rules and paperwork, to the extent feasible, (1) in the aggregate, (2) by 
agency and agency program, and (3) by major rule.214  The accounting 
statement is also required to contain an analysis of impacts of federal 
regulation on state, local, and tribal governments, small businesses, wages, 
and economic growth.  Similar one-year requirements were in previous 
appropriations acts.215
• The Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002 required OMB to 
annually publish, in the Federal Register and on the Internet, a list of the 
compliance assistance resources available to small businesses.
  
216  The Act 
also requires OMB to convene and chair a task force to study the feasibility 
of streamlining paperwork requirements on small businesses.217  The task 
force was required to file an initial report by the end of June 2003, and to 
file a final report by the end of June 2004.218
• The E-Government Act requires the OIRA administrator to work with 
the administrator of OMB’s Office of Electronic Government to establish 
the strategic direction of the government-wide e-government program and 
to oversee its implementation.
  
 219  As discussed later in this article, OIRA 
has been particularly active in the Administration’s e-rulemaking 
initiative.220
• In the 2002 Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act,
  
221 
Congress stated that about $6.3 million of OMB’s $70.7 million 
appropriation was for OIRA, but stipulated that nearly $1.6 million of that 
amount would not be obligated until OMB “submits a report to the 
Committees on Appropriations that provides an assessment of the total 
costs and benefits of implementing Executive Order No. 13,166.”222
Congress also sometimes limits OIRA’s actions through riders on 
OMB’s appropriation.  For example, since 1983, language has been 
 
 
 214. Regulatory Right-to-Know Act § 624. 
 215. OMB, VALIDATING REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 186, at 141.  
 216. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act § 241. 
 217. Id. 
 218. See SMALL BUS. PAPERWORK RELIEF ACT TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT (2004), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/sbpr2004.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 
2006). 
 219. E-Government Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2002). 
 220. See note 257 infra and accompanying text. 
 221. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-67, 
115 Stat. 514. 
 222. Id.  See also Assessment of the Total Benefits and Costs of Implementing Executive 
Order No. 13,166: Improving Access to Services for Persons with Limited English 
Proficiency (Mar. 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/lepfinal3-
14.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2006) (responding to congressional request by using available 
data to estimate benefits and costs). 
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included in OMB’s appropriation stating that none of the funds 
appropriated to OMB could be used for the purpose of reviewing any 
agricultural marketing orders issued by the Department of Agriculture.223  
Marketing orders, which cover dozens of commodities from lemons to milk 
and generally keep prices up by regulating supplies, were targeted for 
elimination or amendment by President Reagan’s task force on regulatory 
relief in the early 1980s.224 In response, members of Congress have 
inserted this restriction in each subsequent appropriation bill, asserting that 
the Department of Agriculture, not OMB, has statutory authority in this 
area. At other times, riders have been included in OMB’s appropriation 
preventing the office from taking other actions (e.g., altering the transcript 
of witnesses’ testimony before certain committees).225
RECENT OIRA INITIATIVES 
 
Although OIRA’s workload has clearly increased as a consequence of a 
series of congressional requirements, OIRA has also has also voluntarily 
taken on additional responsibilities, often basing its actions on the office’s 
interpretation of previous statutory or executive order authority or 
requirements.  Some of these actions (e.g., the issuance of bulletins on peer 
review, guidance, and risk assessment) have been viewed as direct attempts 
by OIRA to expand its influence over agencies.  Other OIRA initiatives 
may have that effect more indirectly, appearing in some cases to be similar 
in many respects to the unsuccessful legislative efforts at regulatory reform 
in the mid-to-late 1990s. 
SOLICITING SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM OF EXISTING RULES 
In addition to requiring an annual “accounting statement” of the costs 
and benefits of regulations, the above-mentioned “Regulatory Right-to-
 
 223. For example, OMB’s appropriation for fiscal year 2006 provides, “none of the funds 
appropriated in this Act for the Office of Management and Budget may be used for the 
purpose of reviewing any agricultural marketing orders or any activities or regulations under 
the provisions of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937.”  See Transportation, 
Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, The Judiciary, The District of Columbia, and 
Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, H.R. 3058,109th Cong. (2005), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ115.109.pdf (last visited May 
12, 2006). 
 224. JAMES L. GATTUSO, HERITAGE FOUND., THE HIGH COSTS AND LOW RETURNS OF 
FARM MARKETING ORDERS (1985), available at 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Agriculture/bg462.cfm. 
 225. Id.  OMB’s fiscal year 2006 appropriation excepted from this prohibition only the 
testimony of OMB witnesses before the committees on appropriations or their 
subcommittees. 
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Know Act” also requires OMB to include “recommendations for reform” in 
its cost-benefit reports.226  OIRA could have interpreted this requirement 
narrowly as requiring recommendations to reform the accounting statement 
or, more generally, to reform the rulemaking process.  Instead, OIRA 
interpreted the provision to mean that OMB must make recommendations 
of specific rules to be reformed.  Further, rather than relying on the 
expertise it honed in reviewing hundreds of significant rules each year, 
OIRA decided to solicit suggestions from the public regarding specific 
rules to be “reformed.”  For example, in May 2001, OIRA asked for 
suggestions on specific regulations that could be “rescinded or changed that 
would increase net benefits to the public.”227  In response, OIRA received 
seventy-one suggestions, which it placed into high, medium, and low 
priority categories.228  In March 2002, OIRA asked the public for 
recommendations to eliminate or modify existing rules as well as to expand 
or extend existing programs.229  In response, OIRA received more than 300 
suggestions, which it then turned over to the appropriate agencies for 
prioritization.230  In February 2004, OIRA asked the public for suggested 
reforms of rules affecting the manufacturing sector.231
 
 226. A similar one-year requirement for “recommendations for reform” was included in 
the Fiscal Year 2000 Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act.  See Treasury 
and General Government Appropriations Act of 2000 § 628(a)(3).  Although business 
groups generally applauded this “look back” effort, environmentalists and public interest 
groups characterized it as the development of a “hit list” of rules that the Bush 
Administration wanted to eliminate.   
  OIRA said it was 
focusing on manufacturing because of the relatively large impact that 
regulations have on that sector.  In March 2005, OIRA reported that it 
received 189 reform nominations, of which federal agencies and OMB 
determined that seventy-six had “potential merit and justify further 
 227. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, DRAFT REPORT ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
FEDERAL REGULATIONS 25, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg/cb_report_notice.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2006). 
 228. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 104-105.  Eight of the twenty-three suggestions 
that OIRA designated a “high priority” involved EPA rules, and five involved rules from the 
Department of Labor.  Id. 
 229. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of 
Federal Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 15,013, 15,033 (Mar. 28, 2002), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/cbreport.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2006). 
 230. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 108-09 (describing these responses and noting 
the ways in which the 2002 effort differed from the 2001 effort). 
 231. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, INFORMING REGULATORY DECISIONS: 2004 DRAFT 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATION AND 
UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/draft_2004_cbreport.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 
2006). 
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action.”232
PEER REVIEW BULLETIN 
  
In September 2003, OIRA published a proposed bulletin in the Federal 
Register on “Peer Review and Information Quality” that would have, if 
made final, provided a standardized process by which all significant 
regulatory information would be peer reviewed.233  Issued under the 
authority of the Information Quality Act, the PRA, and Executive Order 
12,866, the bulletin would have required agencies to (1) have all 
“significant regulatory information” that the agencies intend to disseminate 
peer reviewed, (2) have “especially significant regulatory information” peer 
reviewed according to even higher standards, and (3) provide OIRA with 
information on an annual basis about upcoming significant regulatory 
disseminations, and about the agency’s plans for conducting peer 
reviews.234  The proposed bulletin aroused significant controversy, with 
some observers expressing concern that it could create a centralized peer 
review system within OMB that would be vulnerable to political 
manipulation or control by regulated entities.235
In April 2004, OIRA published a revised version of the proposed 
bulletin in response to nearly 200 comments received from the public.
 
236  
The revised bulletin was broader in scope than the proposed bulletin in that 
it applied to “influential scientific information” (not just regulatory 
information) and “highly influential scientific assessments.”237
 
 232. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY REFORM OF THE MANUFACTURING 
SECTOR 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/reports/manufacturing_initiative.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2006).  
  However, 
agencies were given substantial discretion to decide whether information 
was “influential” and therefore required a peer review, and the bulletin 
provided exemptions for certain classes of information (e.g., routine 
statistical information and products by government-funded scientists that 
 233. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, PEER REVIEW AND INFORMATION QUALITY (Aug. 
2003), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/peer_review_and_info_quality.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2006). 
 234. Id. 
 235. See, e.g., Letter from Sidney A. Shapiro, Director, Ctr. for Progressive Regulation, 
to Dr. Margo Schwab, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs (May 27, 2004), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/peer2004/57.pdf last visited Apr. 24, 2006). 
 236. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REVISED INFORMATION QUALITY BULLETIN FOR 
PEER REVIEW (2004), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/peer_review041404.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2006). 
 237. Id. 
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are not represented as the views of the agency).238  In January 2005, OIRA 
published a final version of the bulletin in the Federal Register that was 
similar in many respects to the revised version.239
GOOD GUIDANCE PRACTICES BULLETIN 
  OMB still retained 
significant authority in certain areas (e.g., when information is “highly 
influential”), so it is unclear how much discretion agencies will be given to 
decide when and what kind of peer review is required. 
An even more recent potential expansion of OIRA’s influence occurred 
in November 2005, when OMB published a “Proposed Bulletin for Good 
Guidance Practices.”240  Noting that agencies have increasingly relied on 
guidance documents to inform the public about regulatory requirements 
and to provide direction to their staff members, OMB said it was concerned 
that these documents “may not receive the benefit of careful consideration 
accorded under the procedures for regulatory development and review.”241  
OMB did not cite any specific statutes or executive orders as authorizing 
the issuance of the bulletin, but it did indicate that it was “responsible both 
for promoting good management practices and for overseeing and 
coordinating the Administration’s regulatory policy.”242
In essence, the proposed bulletin would require agencies (not including 
independent regulatory agencies) to develop written procedures for the 
approval of “significant” guidance documents (defined in essentially the 
same way as “significant” rules in Executive Order 12,866), to maintain a 
list of those documents on its web site, and to allow electronic comments 
on those documents.  For “economically significant” guidance documents 
(e.g., those expected to have a $100 million impact on the economy), 
agencies would be required to publish a notice in the Federal Register 
announcing that the draft guidance document is available, inviting public 
   
 
 238. Id. 
 239. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 
70 Fed. Reg. 2,664 (Jan. 14, 2005).  OMB published the final bulletin on its web site on 
December 15, 2004.  Certain provisions took effect in June 2005, but others did not take 
effect until December 2005.  
 240. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, PROPOSED BULLETIN FOR GOOD GUIDANCE PRACTICES 
(Nov. 23, 2005), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/good_guid/good_guidance_preamble.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2006) [hereinafter OMB, PROPOSED BULLETIN].  On November 30, 2005, 
OMB published a notice and request for comments on the proposed bulletin (but not the 
bulletin itself) in the Federal Register.  See Proposed Bulletin for Good Guidance Practices, 
70 Fed. Reg. 71,866 (Nov. 30, 2005). 
 241. OMB, PROPOSED BULLETIN, supra note 240, at 2. 
 242. Id. at 1. 
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comments, and responding to those comments.243  Although the proposed 
bulletin does not specifically provide a role for OIRA in the approval 
process, some have expressed concerns that the bulletin could allow greater 
opportunities for the office and industry to influence agency decision 
making.244
RISK ASSESSMENT BULLETIN 
  As was the case with the peer review bulletin, OIRA is 
expected to retain significant discretion to decide which documents are 
subject to the bulletin’s requirements. 
As of early 2006, the most recent manifestation of OIRA’s self-initiated 
expansion of its (at least potential) influence was its publication of a 
proposed bulletin on agency risk assessment practices.245  Released for 
public comment and peer review by the National Academy of Sciences on 
January 9, 2006, the stated purpose of the bulletin was “to enhance the 
technical quality and objectivity of risk assessments prepared by federal 
agencies by establishing uniform, minimum standards.”246  The legal 
authority cited for the bulletin included the Information Quality Act, the 
Regulatory Right-to-Know Act, and “OMB’s general authorities to oversee 
the quality of agency analyses, information and regulatory actions.”247  
Public comments were requested on the proposed bulletin by June 2006, 
with the bulletin going into effect twelve months after its publication in 
final form.248
Risk assessments are used in a variety of ways in the federal 
government, and are particularly important in developing regulations 
involving health, safety, or the environment.  The OIRA bulletin described 
a series of general risk assessment and reporting standards (e.g., 
 
 
 243. Because guidance is, by definition, nonbinding, it is not clear how it could have a 
$100 million impact on the economy, and therefore qualify as “economically significant.”  
 244. See, e.g., Cindy Skrzycki, Finding a Way to Better Guidance, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 
2005, at D1.  
 245. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, PROPOSED RISK ASSESSMENT BULLETIN (2006), 
available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/proposed_risk_assessment_bulletin_010906.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2006). 
 246. Id. at 3. 
 247. Id. at 7.  Specifically, OIRA noted that section 515(a) of the IQA requires OMB to 
“provide policy and procedural guidance to Federal agencies for ensuring and maximizing 
the quality, objectivity, utility and integrity of information” disseminated by federal 
agencies.  Id. at 7.  Also, OIRA said that the Regulatory Right-to-Know Act directs OMB to 
“issue guidelines to agencies to standardize . . . measures of costs and benefits.”  Id.  One 
could argue that OIRA had already satisfied these requirements through the issuance of its 
February 2002 IQA guidelines and OMB Circular A-4.  
 248. Id. at 1. 
COPELAND_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:22 PM 
144 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIII 
“summarize the scope of the assessment” and “be scientifically objective”), 
with one set of standards specifically for risk assessments used in 
regulatory analyses.249  It also laid out a set of “special standards for 
influential risk assessments” (i.e., those expected to have a “clear and 
substantial impact on important public policies or private sector 
decisions”).250  The scope of the bulletin is quite broad, subsuming all 
agencies covered by the PRA (including independent regulatory agencies), 
and defining risk assessment in sweeping terms.251  The bulletin requires 
agencies to certify that each covered risk assessment has complied with its 
requirements, but allows agency heads to defer or waive some or all of its 
requirements.252  OIRA and the White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy were made responsible for overseeing the bulletin’s 
implementation.253
E-RULEMAKING OVERSIGHT 
 
OIRA has also been significantly involved in the development of the 
Bush Administration’s electronic rulemaking (“e-rulemaking”) initiative, 
which some have also viewed as having the potential to increase the 
office’s and regulated entities’ influence over agencies’ regulatory 
actions.254  In January 2003, the Bush Administration launched the 
“Regulations.gov” web site as the first module of its e-rulemaking 
initiative.255
 
 249. Id. at 10-11. 
  The web site permits the public to identify proposed rules that 
are open for comment government-wide, and permits the public to 
comment electronically on those rules.  The second module of the initiative 
is the development of a single, government-wide electronic docket for 
proposed and final rules, thereby allowing the public to access regulatory 
supporting materials and the comments of others from one web site.  The 
first agencies were placed on this government-wide docket in November 
 250. Id. at 16. 
 251. Risk assessment is defined as “a scientific and/or technical document that assembles 
and synthesizes scientific information to determine whether a potential hazard exists and/or 
the extent of possible risk to human health, safety, or the environment.”  Id. at 23. 
 252. Id. at 21. 
 253. Id. at 1. 
 254. OMB oversees the e-rulemaking initiative, and it has named EPA as the lead agency 
for the effort, replacing DOT.  For a discussion of this initiative, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, GAO-05-777, ELECTRONIC RULEMAKING: PROGRESS MADE IN DEVELOPING 
CENTRALIZED E-RULEMAKING SYSTEM (2005) [hereinafter GAO, ELECTRONIC 
RULEMAKING]. 
 255. The eRulemaking Initiative, 
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main (last visited May 9, 2006). 
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2005, and other agencies are expected to move to the system during 2006 
and 2007.256
A centralized docket would . . .  dramatize and enhance OMB’s and 
OIRA’s already central role.  Together with information specialists at 
EPA, they are the ones creating this new apparatus, and to have all 
information travel through their gateway only adds to the possibilities of 
their influence . . . .  As agencies become more transparent, they become 
more transparent to the President as well as to the public.  It used to be 
that the number of copies of materials in the docket was limited, and it 
was physically located at the agency.  Now the docket is immediately 
available on equal and easy terms to all who want it, including the 
President, and politics will give him the incentive to attend to it.
  Although some analysts believe that a government-wide 
electronic docket could improve the ability of the public to provide useful 
rulemaking comments, others are less sanguine about the influence of such 
a system: 
257
OIRA INITIATIVES AND PREVIOUS REFORM EFFORTS 
   
Several of the OIRA initiatives since 2001 appear to be attempts to 
accomplish administratively (through circulars, bulletins, guidance, reports, 
and actions by OIRA desk officers) what regulatory reform advocates were 
not able to accomplish legislatively during the previous decade.  During the 
mid-to-late 1990s, Congress considered a number of pieces of 
comprehensive regulatory reform legislation, none of which was ultimately 
enacted.258  For example, S. 746, considered by the 106th Congress in 
1999, would have established detailed procedures for preparing cost-benefit 
analyses and risk assessments, and for using them in the rulemaking 
process.259
 
 256. GAO, ELECTRONIC RULEMAKING, supra note 
  The specific requirements in the bill for cost-benefit analysis 
were generally similar to (although not as detailed as) those in OMB 
Circular A-4, issued in 2003.  The requirements for risk assessment in the 
bill were generally similar to those in the proposed risk assessment bulletin 
issued in 2006, although the bulletin will (if adopted) apply more broadly.  
S. 746 would have also required agencies to provide for an independent 
peer review of any required risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses of 
254, at 19. 
 257. Richard G. Stoll & Katherine L. Lazarski, Rulemaking, in DEVELOPMENTS IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY PRACTICE, 2003-2004, at 160 (Jeffrey S. Lubbers 
ed. 2004).  
 258. See Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999, S. 746, 106th Cong. (1999); 
Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S. 343, 104th Cong. (1995); Regulatory 
Improvement Act of 1997, S. 981, 105th Cong. (1997). 
 259. See Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999, S. 746, §§ 623, 624, 106th Congress 
(1999), available at http://www.senate.gov/~govt-aff/s746.htm (last visited May 12, 2006). 
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major rules that the agencies or OMB anticipated would have a $500 
million impact on the economy.260
Other recent initiatives are similarly reflective of previous legislative 
reform efforts.  For example, OIRA’s interpretation of the 
“recommendations for reform” provisions in the Regulatory Right-to-Know 
Act resulted in broad-scale calls for the public to nominate existing 
regulations for review and possible elimination or modification.
  OMB’s bulletin on peer review 
contains many of the same requirements, but (like the risk assessment 
bulletin) applies to more rules than the legislation would have if it had been 
enacted. 
261  S. 343 
in the 104th Congress would have also required a review of existing agency 
rules, although the reviews contemplated in the legislation would have been 
conducted by the agencies themselves, not the public, and were focused on 
major rules.262
OIRA AND THE FUTURE OF PRESIDENTIAL REGULATORY REVIEW  
 
For twenty-five years, OIRA has played a central role in the federal 
rulemaking process.  Although some argued early in OIRA’s history that 
the office’s regulatory review role was unconstitutional, few observers 
continue to hold that view.  No court has directly addressed the 
constitutionality of the OIRA regulatory review process, but in 1981 (the 
year that OIRA was created) the D.C. Circuit said the following:  
The court recognizes the basic need of the President and his White House 
staff to monitor the consistency of agency regulations with Administration 
policy.  He and his advisors surely must be briefed fully and frequently 
about rules in the making, and their contributions to policymaking 
considered.  The executive power under our Constitution, after all, is not 
shared—it rests exclusively with the President.263
OIRA is located within the Executive Office of the President and is the 
President’s direct representative in the government-wide rulemaking 
process.  As Executive Order 12,866 states, OIRA is the “repository of 
expertise on regulatory issues” within the executive branch, and is uniquely 
positioned both within OMB (with its budgetary influence) and within the 
federal rulemaking process (reviewing and commenting on rules just before 
  
 
 260. See id. at §§ 625. 
 261. See note 226 supra for a discussion of OMB’s calls for “recommendations for 
reform.” 
 262. See S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, COMPREHENSIVE REGULATORY REFORM 
ACT OF 1995, S. REP. NO. 104-89 (1995) (noting that section 625 of the bill would have 
required the review of existing rules). 
 263. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  
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they are published in the Federal Register) to enable it to exert maximum 
influence.264
Variations in how OIRA operates—as a gatekeeper or a counselor—are 
largely a function of the wishes of the President that the office serves.  For 
example, in a June 2001 article in the Harvard Law Review, Elena Kagan 
posited that, while it is generally acknowledged that President Reagan used 
OIRA’s review function as a tool to control the policy and political agenda 
in an anti-regulatory manner, President Clinton did much the same thing to 
accomplish pro-regulatory objectives.
 
265  She argued that Clinton did so by 
exercising directive authority and asserting personal ownership over a 
range of agency actions, thereby making them “presidential” in nature.266  
She also characterized this emergence of enhanced methods of presidential 
control over the regulatory state—what she termed the “presidentialization 
of administration”—as “the most important development in the last two 
decades in administrative process.”267  Similarly, William F. West 
concluded that OIRA’s regulatory review process “has promoted executive 
interests across administrations precisely because the process has 
internalized incumbents’ political preferences.”268  Therefore, instead of 
the “neutral competence” that some assert that bureaucracy can best 
provide presidents, West characterizes OIRA’s performance as “responsive 
competence.”269
Other observers, however, view OIRA (like other executive branch 
agencies) as having more of a shared allegiance between the President and 
the Congress.
 
270  They point out that OIRA was created by Congress, and 
has been given a number of statutory responsibilities through the PRA and 
other laws.  Nevertheless, even supporters of a strong legislative 
perspective recognize that OIRA is part of the Executive Office of the 
President, and that Congress gave OIRA its responsibilities because of its 
strategic position within that office.271
 
 264. Executive Order No. 12,866, supra note 
  With both statutory and executive 
order responsibilities, OIRA embodies a broader tension between Congress 
74, at 51,736. 
 265. Elana Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2248 (2001). 
 266. Id. at 2250. 
 267. Id. at 2383. 
 268. William F. West, The Institutionalization of Regulatory Review: Organizational 
Stability and Responsive Competence at OIRA, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 76, 76 (2005).  
 269. Id. at 91. 
 270. See generally DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM, BUILDING A LEGISLATIVE-CENTERED PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION, 1946-1999 (2001) 
 271. Id. at 56 (“[W]here coordinated government-wide clearance is required to achieve 
Congress’ policy objectives, there may be few or no alternatives (to paperwork and 
regulatory review within OMB).”). 
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and the President for control of administrative agencies. 
Although major differences of opinion exist among observers of the 
federal rulemaking process regarding the appropriateness of OIRA’s 
regulatory review role, the broad reach and influence of the office is 
undebatable.  Rulemaking agencies formally challenge OIRA’s returns and 
“suggestions” for change only rarely, and (as noted previously) sometimes 
refrain from even submitting draft rules for review if they believe they will 
be opposed by OIRA.  Regulated entities also recognize OIRA’s influence, 
and seem to view the office as a “court of second resort” if they are unable 
to influence regulatory agencies to their position directly.  
POSSIBLE LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 
Congress also recognizes the importance that OIRA plays in the 
rulemaking process, and usually holds several hearings each year 
examining OIRA’s implementation of its responsibilities pursuant to 
various statutes and executive orders.  Proposals for changes to OIRA’s 
authority and responsibilities have focused on such issues as (1) providing 
a statutory underpinning for regulatory reviews, (2) increasing or 
decreasing the office’s funding and staffing, (3) including independent 
agencies’ rules under the office’s regulatory review function, and (4) 
improving the transparency of OIRA’s regulatory review processes. 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR REGULATORY REVIEW  
As noted previously, Congress has enacted legislation expanding 
OIRA’s statutory responsibilities, and has considered (but not enacted) 
legislation that would provide a statutory basis for OIRA’s regulatory 
review function.  For example, in the 106th Congress, S. 746 (the 
Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999) would have required the President, 
via OMB and OIRA, to “establish a process for the review and 
coordination of Federal agency regulatory actions.”272
Congress has also considered legislation that would affect OIRA as part 
of broader OMB changes.  For example, during the 107th Congress, 
proposed legislation was introduced  (but not enacted) that would have 
established an Office of Management within the Executive Office of the 
President and redesignated OMB as the Office of the Federal Budget.
  The proposed 
legislation also would have codified many of the transparency requirements 
in Executive Order 12,866.  
273
 
 272. Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999, S. 746, 106th Cong. § 632 (1999). 
  
 273. See H.R. 616, 107th Cong. (2001). 
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As part of that process, OIRA and other offices within OMB would have 
been abolished and their functions and authorities transferred to the new 
Office of Management. 
FUNDING AND STAFFING 
OIRA does not have a specific line item in the budget, so its funding is 
part of OMB’s appropriation.  Similarly, OIRA’s staffing levels are 
allocated from OMB’s totals.  Although OIRA staffing has increased in 
recent years, OIRA still has fewer staff than it had when its regulatory 
review function was first established in 1981.274  Currently, about thirty 
OIRA desk officers and branch chiefs review about 3,000 agency 
information collection requests each year and about 700 significant rules 
each year.275  At various times in its history, certain members of Congress 
have attempted to reduce funding for OIRA in order to signal congressional 
displeasure with the office’s actions.276  Other observers, however, believe 
that OIRA’s funding should be increased, not reduced, arguing that a 
relatively small amount of additional resources for OIRA could yield 
substantial benefits.277
At other times, proposed legislation has been introduced that designates 
the manner in which OIRA staff should be used.  For example, a provision 
in H.R. 2432, as originally introduced, would have required the OMB 
Director to “assign, at a minimum, the equivalent of at least two full time 
staffers to review the Federal information collection burden on the public 
imposed by the Internal Revenue Service.”
  
278  The Internal Revenue 
Service accounts for more than eighty percent of the estimated paperwork 
burden, but OIRA indicated that it devoted less than one FTE to reviewing 
the agency’s paperwork requests (because much of the burden is mandated 
by statute).279
 
 274. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 
  The Bush Administration objected to this specific direction 
6, at 60. 
 275. Id.  Although OIRA had fifty-five authorized full-time-equivalent positions in 2003, 
many of those staff worked in the office’s non-regulatory branches (information policy and 
technology, and statistical and science policy) or as administrative staff. 
 276. For example, as noted previously, in OMB’s appropriation for 2002, Congress 
stipulated that nearly $1.6 million should not be obligated until OMB submitted a report 
assessing the total costs and benefits of implementing Executive Order No. 13,166.  See 
note 222 supra and accompanying text. 
 277. See, e.g., ROBERT W. HAHN & ROBERT E. LITAN, AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CTR. FOR 
REGULATORY STUDIES, POLICY MATTERS 03-34, WHY CONGRESS SHOULD INCREASE 
FUNDING FOR OMB REVIEW OF REGULATIONS (2003).  
 278. Paperwork and Regulatory Improvements Act of 2004, H.R. 2432, 108th Cong. § 3 
(2004). 
 279. See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Natural Resources & 
Regulatory Affairs, H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. (Apr. 11, 2003) (statement of 
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of OIRA staff, so the sponsors of the bill agreed to delete this requirement 
before it was approved by the House of Representatives in May 2004.280
ADDITION OF INDEPENDENT AGENCIES’ RULES  
  
Several of the statutes that OIRA helps to administer include rules issued 
by independent regulatory agencies (e.g., the PRA, the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act, the Congressional Review Act, and the Information Quality 
Act).  Also, several recent OIRA initiatives (e.g., the November 2005 
bulletin on guidance practices and the January 2006 bulletin on risk 
assessment) cover those agencies as well as cabinet departments.  
However, the executive orders that have established regulatory review 
within OIRA have always explicitly excluded rules issued by those 
agencies.281  Some observers have suggested that this limitation be lifted, 
arguing that independent regulatory agencies issue regulations that have a 
significant impact on the economy (about $230 billion per year according 
to OIRA), but their rules often contain little quantitative information on 
regulatory costs and benefits.282
TRANSPARENCY OF REVIEWS  
  Those opposed to this expansion in 
OIRA’s duties point out that independent regulatory agencies were 
established to be relatively independent of the President, and the inclusion 
of their rules under OIRA’s authority would threaten the basic structure on 
which they were founded.  In response, proponents argue that independent 
regulatory agencies’ rules are already reviewed for purposes such as 
paperwork clearance and ensuring that data quality requirements are met, 
so examining the substance of the rules is just an extension of those 
reviews. 
One consistent area of concern to some observers has been the lack of 
transparency of the OIRA review process to the public.  Notwithstanding 
recent improvements, they argue that it is difficult for the public to know 
 
John D. Graham, OIRA Administrator), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/testimony/graham041103.html (last visited May 
12, 2006). 
 280. As reported, the bill required the OMB Director to identify actions that IRS could 
take to reduce paperwork burden on small businesses. 
 281. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 74, § 2(b) (defining covered agencies 
as those “other than those considered to be independent regulatory agencies, as defined in 
44 U.S.C. § 3502(10)”). 
 282. See, e.g., CTR. FOR REGULATORY EFFECTIVENESS, A BLUEPRINT FOR OMB REVIEW OF 
INDEPENDENT AGENCY REGULATIONS (2002).  The previously mentioned bill, S. 746, that 
proposed to establish the presidential review of rules in law, would have included rules 
issued by independent regulatory agencies. 
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with any degree of certainty what changes OIRA has suggested to 
agencies’ draft rules, what contacts OIRA has made with regulated entities 
and other outside parties regarding those rules, or whether documents were 
exchanged between OIRA and the agencies.  In its September 2003 report, 
GAO said that the documentation that agencies are required to provide 
showing the changes made at OIRA’s suggestion or recommendation were 
not always available and, when so provided, were not always clear or 
consistent.283
• Although OIRA indicated that it can have its greatest impact on 
agencies’ rules during informal reviews before review packages are 
formally submitted, OIRA indicated that agencies only had to disclose the 
changes made at OIRA’s suggestion during formal review (some of which 
were as short as one day).  GAO recommended that OIRA define this 
requirement in the executive order to include informal reviews, just as it 
did with regard to the requirements involving the office’s communications 
with outside parties.
  GAO also said that the transparency requirements incumbent 
on OIRA were not always clear, and recommended several improvements.  
For example: 
284
• As noted previously, the “consistent with change” code in OIRA’s 
database does not differentiate between OIRA- or agency-initiated changes, 
or changes that were major or minor in nature.  GAO recommended that 
the database be changed to more clearly indicate which rules were 
substantively changed at OIRA’s suggestion.
 
285
• GAO also recommended refinements to the executive order’s 
requirements applicable to OIRA (e.g., more clearly indicating on its web 
site the regulatory actions being discussed at meetings with outside parties 
and the affiliations of the participants) and the requirements applicable to 
the agencies (e.g., defining the types of “substantive” changes that agencies 
should disclose).
  
286
In commenting on GAO’s report, the Administrator of OIRA said that 
the office planned to review its implementation of the executive order’s 
transparency requirements and would work to improve the clarity of its 
meeting log.
 
287  However, he also said he did not believe that changes 
made during informal OIRA reviews should be disclosed—even though he 
said that OIRA can have its greatest influence during informal reviews.288
 
 283. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 
  
6, at 85. 
 284. Id. at 14-15. 
 285. Id. at 15. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. at 214. 
 288. Id. 
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
John Graham was sworn in as OIRA Administrator in July 2001, making 
him the ninth person to occupy that position since the office was created in 
1981.289  In October 2005, Graham announced that he would leave the 
office in early 2006 and become dean of the Frederick S. Pardee Rand 
Graduate School in Santa Monica, California.290
Administrator Graham’s tenure at OIRA has been both criticized and 
praised, sometimes by the same observers. The actions generating the most 
criticism (particularly from those advocating stronger health, safety, and 
environmental rules) have often involved the assertion of OIRA’s authority 
over agency rules, either directly (e.g., through prompt and return letters 
and the general reassertion of the office’s “gatekeeper” role) or indirectly 
(e.g., through its recent bulletins on peer review, guidance documents, and 
risk assessment).  There is some evidence that OIRA has more recently 
adopted a somewhat less confrontational (or at least less visibly 
confrontational) approach in its relations with the agencies.  As noted 
previously, the number of OIRA return letters and prompt letters has 
declined precipitously in recent years.  As one observer in 2004 said, “after 
three years both OMB and agencies have come to a sufficient level of 
mutual understanding and accommodation that such blunt tools are only 
needed in exceptional circumstances.”
  Although the Executive 
Order governing the review process has not substantively changed since its 
issuance in 1993, Graham made numerous changes in how the order was 
implemented and, more generally, how the office operated, during his 
nearly five years as OIRA Administrator.  Under his leadership, OIRA has 
become less of a reactive, “end of the pipeline” reviewer and more of an 
activist, instigative organization than under any previous administrator.  
Evidence of this activist philosophy can be found in virtually all of the 
initiatives begun during Graham’s tenure in office, and even in the manner 
that OIRA has interpreted certain provisions in law.  For example, under 
some previous administrators, OIRA would not have been likely to 
interpret the “recommendations for reform” language in the Regulatory 
Right-to-Know Act as a requirement for agencies to solicit the public’s 
views regarding which regulations merited reconsideration.  
291
 
 289. Public Citizen, John Graham Nomination Confirmed, 
http://www.citizen.org/congress/regulations/graham.html (last visited May 12, 2006). 
 
 290. Press Release, The Frederick S. Pardee Rand Graduate School, OMB Regulatory 
Affairs Head and Former Harvard Professor John Graham Announced as New PRGS Dean 
(Oct. 18, 2005), available at http://www.prgs.edu/news/new_dean.1005.html (last visited 
May 11, 2006). 
 291. James W. Conrad, Jr., Regulatory Policy, in DEVELOPMENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE 
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The actions of Administrator Graham that have generated the most 
widespread praise have been those designed to improve the transparency of 
OIRA’s review process, particularly the posting of the agency’s meetings 
with outside parties on its web site.  Of particular note and praise from 
virtually all observers was his decision to post a record of those meetings 
on the OIRA site even if they occurred before the rule was formally 
submitted to OIRA.  In doing so, Graham implicitly recognized that 
presidential review of rulemaking can occur before the formal OIRA 
review process begins.  On the other hand, as of early 2006, the changes 
that Administrator Graham committed to make to these postings to clarify 
the rules being discussed and the identities of the participants still had not 
been made.  The meeting log on OIRA’s web site still uses acronyms such 
as “CAIR” and “NBP” to indicate the subject of the meeting, and the 
affiliations of those attending the meetings (much less their clients) are still 
not clear.  Also, OIRA’s coding of the outcomes of its reviews in its 
database is still unclear.  A rule coded as “consistent with change” suggests 
that OIRA’s review had an effect on the rule, when in fact the agency may 
have simply submitted a new draft.  OIRA’s database also does not 
differentiate between a major change in the focus and effect of a rule, and a 
change that merely affects a matter so slight as a punctuation mark 
contained in the rule’s text.  
Even more importantly, OIRA still discourages agencies from disclosing 
changes made to their rules at OIRA’s suggestion during “informal 
reviews”—the period when OIRA says it has its greatest influence on 
agencies’ rules.  Unless those changes are disclosed, any claims of OIRA 
transparency will ring somewhat hollow.  No one has advocated that all 
informal discussions between the agencies and OIRA during the rule 
development process be made public, even after the fact.  But certainly 
when agencies and OIRA are exchanging drafts of rules, and agencies are 
making changes to those drafts at OIRA’s suggestion before formal 
submission, agencies could be required to disclose those changes after the 
rules have been published in the Federal Register.  This is particularly 
important in those instances when informal reviews go on for weeks or 
months, but the period of formal review may be limited to one day. 
Some might argue that even if these recommended improvements to 
OIRA transparency are implemented, the effect of OIRA’s reviews on 
agencies rules can be hidden in other ways.  For example, even if agencies 
or OIRA are required to disclose all of the changes made at the office’s 
suggestion or recommendation, OIRA could simply channel its comments 
 
LAW AND REGULATORY PRACTICE 122 (Jeffrey S. Lubbers, ed. 2002). 
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through other entities (e.g., other parts of OMB, other parts of the 
Executive Office of the President, or even through other executive branch 
agencies as part of the interagency review process).  Nevertheless, because 
it is clear that there is a lack of transparency in what OIRA itself calls the 
most important part of the process, improvements in OIRA transparency 
should not be dismissed simply because the office’s effects may be 
disguised in other ways. 
THE FUTURE 
Although the effects of Administrator Graham’s initiatives on OIRA in 
recent years are particularly notable, other OIRA administrators have also 
had a major effect on how the office operates.  In many ways, OIRA 
usually assumes the personality of the administrator and, more indirectly, 
of the President whom the administrator serves. The President’s nominee to 
succeed Administrator Graham is likely to continue this pattern, putting his 
or her stamp on the office while continuing the reforms that Graham 
initiated (at least until then end of this President’s term).  As noted 
previously, OIRA is the President’s official agent in the rulemaking 
process, and helps ensure that the President’s vision for agency rules is 
realized.  OIRA’s regulatory review role on behalf of the President, once 
controversial, is now virtually unchallenged.  However, OIRA is also a 
creature of, and is funded by Congress, and therefore must answer to it 
regarding the implementation of its statutory authority and during the 
appropriations process.  During the last few years, Congress has not 
significantly challenged OIRA’s recent initiatives, or encouraged OIRA to 
go further in terms of its transparency.  Whether this trend will continue in 
the future is, at this writing, unclear. 
 
